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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the Option can be specifically enforced when it is

supported by "other good and valuable considerationM not specifically
itemized on the face of the Option and when it was exercised after an
attempted withdrawal of the Option by the optionor.
2.

Whether parol evidence was admissible to show that the

Option and other related contracts were not individually integrated,
that the parties did not intend part of the consideration recited in
the Option to be paid and that the subject matter of the other
separate, but contemporaneous, contracts was intended to provide
overlapping consideration for the Option, all as parts of one
multi-faceted and interdependent transaction.
3.

Whether the trial court did find, as Appellants allege, that

the totality of the interdependent transactions entered into by
Appellants and Colman were simply a loan secured by a mortgage and,
if so, the legal effect of such a finding.
4.

Whether the subject Option was an

,f

extension11 of a prior,

valid and binding option; and, if so, whether any such extension was
supported by adequate consideration.
5.

Whether the trial court properly admitted into evidence for

a limited purpose a partyfs handwritten notes, alleged to be
fragmentary and incomplete.
6.

Whether Respondent is legally entitled to the interest

accruing on the tender sum deposited with the Clerk of the Court
after Appellants wrongfully repudiated said tender and retained
possession of the ranch?

-2STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for specific performance of an option to buy
land and for payment of accruing interest on the rejected tender sum.
Appellants have appealed from the Judgment and Decree entered on August 7, 1986 by the First Judicial District Court, the Honorable Omer
J. Call presiding, ordering specific performance for Plaint iff/Respondent Ernest J. Miller and also awarding him the accrued interest.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Third Party Defendant Bill Colman is a shareholder and President
of Royalty Investment Corporation ("Royalty11), a Utah corporation.
Colman acquired the "Anderson Ranch11 %(an 1,840 acre ranch in Cache
County, Utah) for Royalty by purchasing the same in 1961 under a
Contract of Sale with LaMar Anderson and Lucille Anderson as Sellers.
(F. 1, 3; Tr. 53, 651)
In the late Summer or early Fall of 1981, Colman approached Appellant John Archer for a loan of $750,000.00, which Colman urgently
needed to continue development of his Carson Sink salt project (certain mineral rights and evaporation ponds in Nevada used for commercial salt production).

Said mineral project (owned by Owanah Oil

Corporation, of which Colman was President) was in serious financial
trouble.

Subsequently, Archer advised Colman that Archer and Appel-

lant Elliott Wolfe, with whom Archer had discussed Colman1s offer,
were not interested in a simple loan, nor were they interested in advancing the amount requested.

Colman suggested that any funds ad-

vanced could be secured by the Anderson Ranch.

(Tr. 533-539)

The

possibility of a limited partnership interest in the Carson Sink salt
project was also discussed.

Based upon these prelirainary discus-

-3sions, Colman had his long time attorney, Frank J. Allen (Tr.
545), prepare a document (Ex. 1) by which Archer and Wolfe would
invest $600,000.00 in a limited partnership for the Carson Sink
project, which investment Colman would secure with a Trust Deed on
the Anderson Ranch.

Said document was never executed.

(F. 4, 5, 6;

Tr. 41, 42, 48, 533-536, 550, 731, 972)
After considering certain tax savings possibilities with their
accountants, Archer and Wolfe subsequently advised Colman that they
were only interested in advancing Colman $500,000.00 total for his
salt project, and only on condition that the $500,000.00 be structured to appear by written record as (1) an investment of $250,000.00 in
a limited partnership on the salt project, providing tax write-offs
for research and development expenses, and with an interest in profits during the life of the partnership and an overriding royalty
thereafter, and (2) a payment of $250,000.00 as the purchase price
for the Anderson Ranch, coupled with a one-year option in Colman to
reacquire the Ranch for $600,000.00, which would permit Appellants to
treat the difference as a capital gain.

(F. 2, 7, 8; Tr. 152,

430-431, 739-740, 788, 796, 822, 829, 842, 846)
principle.

Colman agreed in

In October and/or November of 1981, Archer, Wolfe and

Colman met with Allen at the latterfs office on at least two separate
occasions, first to discuss their agreement and later to execute the
documents prepared by Mr. Allen pursuant to their instructions.
Allen was advised by Archer, Wolfe and Colman that, although the
primary purpose of the arrangement was to get $500,000.00 to Colman
for his salt project, they wanted the deal structured such that it
would appear as three separate transactions (i.e., the limited

-4partnership, the purchase of the ranch, and the option back to
Colman on the ranch) in order to secure Archer and Wolfe all the tax
advantages they were seeking.

The structure of the deal was not so

critical to Colman as was securing the $500,000.00 from the
Appellants, so long as he had an opportunity to reacquire the
Anderson Ranch.

(F. 8; Tr. 44-46, 61-62, 93-94, 554, 739, 747-748,

764, 812-816, 822, 829, 848, 909-911)
Pursuant to the directions received from Archer, Wolfe and Colman, Allen prepared the Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership of Solar Chemical Company for Archer and Wolfe's $250,000.00
contribution to the salt project (Ex. 3, hereinafter the "Limited
Partnership Agreement"), the Contract for Purchase of Real Property
for the purchase by Appellants of the Anderson Ranch for $250,000.00
(Ex. 4, hereinafter the "Purchase Contract"), the Special Warranty
Deed from Royalty to the Appellants (Ex. 5 ) , and an option from
Appellants to Colman to permit him to repurchase the Anderson Ranch
for $600,000.00.

Subsequently, and before any of these key documents

were signed by the parties, Archer and Wolfe agreed to give Colman an
option on the Anderson Ranch for 1-1/2 years for a purchase price of
$650,000.00 (Ex. 8, hereinafter the "Option").

The parties never

executed the original one (l)-year option for $600,000.00 drafted by
Allen.

(F. 9; Tr. 60, 65, 114, 137, 152-153, 162, 166, 170, 842,

846)
The Limited Partnership Agreement establishing Solar Chemical
Company was dated October 15, 1981, as was Archer's initial check to
Owanah Oil Corporation for $50,000.00 (Ex. 23). It provided for
periodic contributions by the Limited Partners, Archer and Wolfe,

-5totalling $250,000.00, and states that Archer and Wolfe were each to
receive a five percent (57Q) share in Solar Chemical's net profits
over three (3) years and a one-half of one percent (.O57o) overriding
royalty thereafter on all sodium salts recovered from the project.

(F. 10, 11)
The Purchase Contract between Royalty and Appellants (signed by

Colman, as President) was an executory contract for the sale of the
Anderson Ranch to the Appellants, specifying January 4, 1982 as the
closing date.

It was dated November 9, 1981, as was Wolfe's check to

Royalty for $100.00.

The Special Warranty Deed conveying the Ander-

son Ranch from Royalty to Appellants (again signed by Colman, as
President) was dated January 4, 1982 (Ex. 5 ) . (F. 12, 13)
The Option from the Appellants to Colman (Ex. 8) was dated March
of 1982 (viz,, "this

day of March, 1982").

The Option gave

Colman the right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch on or before July 2,
1983 for $650,000.00.

It was executed by Archer, his wife, Elizabeth

Archer, and Wolfe in their individual and respective trustee
capacities.

Archer testified that after he and Wolfe had signed the

Option, he took it to his wife that same day, secured her signature
and returned the same to either Mr. Colman or Mr. Allen the next day
or the day thereafter.

(F. 14; Tr. 589)

All of the aforereferenced documents, Exhibits 3, 4, 5 and 8,
were prepared at or about the same time by Frank Allen, pursuant
to the instructions of the parties, as part of a unified, interdependent transaction.

The trial court found that they were all executed

by the parties on the same date, most likely November 9, 1981.
(F. 15: Tr. 44-46, 65, 76. 93-95, 114, 136, 140, 152. 162, 176, 211,

-6214, 916, 1007)

Colman and his attorney required a simultaneous

execution of the documents, particularly the Purchase Contract, the
original Special Warranty Deed and the Option, in order to assure
Colman of his right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch, even though
the dates were spaced out for Appellants' tax purposes.

Archer,

likewise, was unwilling to part with his first check for $50,000.00
prior to securing his and Wolfe's position with a contract and deed
to the Anderson Ranch.

Colman did not cash Archer's check to Owanah

Oil in the amount of $50,000.00, dated October 15, 1981 (Exhibit 23),
until on or about November 10, 1981, as indicated on the back of said
check.

(F. 16, 17; Tr. 65, 69, 71, 113, 162, 166, 177, 617-620, 911,

936, 1007)
The Option reads that it was given to Colman "in consideration
of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) and other good and
valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged".
The recital of "$5,000.00 and other good and valuable consideration"
came from Allen, who had also inserted the same figure and language
in the original, one-year, $600,000.00 draft option, which was never
executed, as a legal shorthand for the true consideration between the
parties.

The fictitious $5,000.00 was carried over to the Option

(Ex. 8 ) , which reflects the parties' agreement to give Colman an
option for 1-1/2 years for an additional $50,000.00 (making the total
option price $650,000.00), which Option was executed.
never intended the $5,000.00 to be paid.

The parties

It was merely window-dress-

ing which Allen pulled out of the air and inserted to give credence
to the document.

(F. 20, 21; Tr. 64, 152-156, 634-635)

By the terms

of the Option, the Appellants acknowledged their receipt of the

-7$5,000,00, even though they had not received it, because they
knew it was not to be paid.
consisted of the

The real consideration for the Option

fl

other good and valuable consideration11, which

included the conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Special Warranty
Deed from Royalty to the Appellants, the $650,000.00 to be paid for
the Anderson Ranch upon exercise of the Option, the Limited
Partnership profit sharing and the overriding royalty, and the
various tax benefits accruing to the Appellants by structuring the
total transaction their way.

(F. 21, Tr. 373-379, 1007-1012, 1021)

The Appellants represented to Colman and his attorney that the Option
would give Colman the right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch.
Appellants intended that Colman and his attorney should rely on those
representations and upon the sufficiency of the Option, as executed;
and Colman did so rely and granted Appellants a deed to the Anderson
Ranch.

(F. 27; Tr. 160, 166, 301-302)

Colman never paid $5,000.00 to the Appellants for the Option.
Neither Archer nor Wolfe ever made any written request to Colman to
pay the $5,000.00.

When Archer and Wolfe apparently made their first

verbal inquiry regarding payment of the $5,000.00 several months
after the Option was signed, Colman told him that he did not believe
he had to pay the $5,000.00.

When Colman subsequently contacted

Allen, Allen confirmed that the $5,000.00 was never intended to be
paid inasmuch as the multiple considerations supporting the total
deal also supported the Option.

Allen consistently advised anyone

who asked that the parties to the Option never intended for Colman to
pay the $5,000.00.

(F. 25, 26: Tr. 578, 635 ? 924, 1006, 1012: and

Colman Affidavit, Ex. 28)

The Appellants' later trial testimony as

-8to their purported negotiations and the calculations which they
allege resulted in the $5,000.00 consideration for the Option (Tr,
558-568, 578, 628, 760-764, 834-837) is contradicted not only by
Allen's testimony, Colman1s Affidavit and to some degree by Colman1s
testimony (Tr. 152, 154-156), but also by Appellants1 own pleadings
(viz, , paragraph 4 of their Third-Party Complaint).
Archer and Wolfe never visited the Anderson Ranch or the Carson
Sink salt project until the Spring of 1982 -- several months after
they had signed their agreements with Colman.

They never checked the

title to the Carson Sink properties, nor did they ever verify the
water rights appurtenant to the Anderson Ranch, until the Spring of
1982.

They never secured title insurance on the Anderson Ranch.

Their overriding royalty rights in the Carson Sink still had not been
assigned to them at the time of trial.

No profits have ever been

paid out by Solar Chemical to Archer or Wolfe.

(F. 28, 29; Tr.

486-488, 498-499, 503, 517, 784, 798)
In the late Spring or early Summer of 1982, Miller learned from
Archer and Wolfe that they had obtained an interest in the Anderson
Ranch, but Miller did not at this time learn the nature of that
interest.

In August or September of 1982, Miller discussed the

status of the Anderson Ranch with Colman, who represented to Miller
that Archer and Wolfe's interest in the Anderson Ranch was in the
nature of a security interest.

At the same time, Colman indicated a

desire to sell his rights in the Anderson Ranch to Miller if he could
not secure the necessary funds.

(F. 34; Tr. 219-221, 236-237)

On November 2, 1982, Colman and his attorney, Allen, met Respondent, his attorney, William L. Fillmore, and John Miller at the Salt

-9Lake Airport and reviewed and executed a certain Real Estate
Contract between Colman and Miller (Ex. 9, hereinafter the "Real
Estate Contract11).

The Real Estate Contract assigned Colman1 s rights

under the Option to Miller, granting Miller an independent right to
exercise the Option and acquire 100% of the Anderson Ranch in fee
simple on or before June 18, 1983.

Colman knowingly, voluntarily and

with advice of counsel warranted in the Real Estate Contract to
Miller that

,f

the Option is valid and enforceable and, further, that

it is freely assignable in its entirety without the consent or
approval of any third party.11

(F. 35-38, Tr.

79, 142, 184)

After Appellants received written notice from Respondents
attorney of Colmanfs assignment of his Option rights to Respondent,
Archer called Fillmore on or about January 4, 1983 and told Fillmore,
among other things, that the $5,000.00 for the Option had never been
paid by Colman.

Nonetheless, Archer and Wolfe told Fillmore that

they were still willing to sell the Anderson Ranch to Respondent if
he would pay $655,000.00.

During January and February of 1983,

Archer, Wolfe and Fillmore engaged in negotiations for Respondent
Miller's purchase of the Anderson Ranch; but the sale was never
consummated because the parties could not agree upon terms (e.g., the
down payment) and Respondent wanted a waiver from Colman of his
rights under paragraph 4.a. of the Real Estate Contract (a limited
option to repurchase the ranch entirely from Respondent) before
Respondent committed his funds.

(F. 42, 43; Tr. 251, 477-483)

On April 8, 1983, Appellants attempted to revoke the Option by a
letter to Colman (with a copy to Respondent) from Appellants' prior
attorney, Gregory P. Williams, (Ex. 15), wherein said attorney stated

-10that "the offer has been withdrawn".

On April 15, 1983, Colman,

Allen, Respondent Miller, Fillmore, John Miller and John Clay (an
employee of Respondent) met at Allen's office in Salt Lake to confirm
what Allen and Colman had represented previously as to the
history and intent behind the Option given Colman by the Appellants,
in light of Archer and Wolfe's position on the $5,000.00 and what
appeared to be a probability of litigation.

Colman and Allen

reaffirmed at that meeting that the $5,000.00 was never intended to
be paid, but was a number pulled out of the air by Allen as he prepared the documents, and that the series of documented transactions
were all part of one, unified, interrelated deal by which the parties
intended to get $500,000.00 to Colman for his salt project, make the
Appellants secure with the Anderson Ranch and guaranty Colman the
right to reacquire the ranch upon his payback of the $500,000.00 plus
a $150,000.00 premium, structured in such a way as to give Appellants
additional incentives (e.g., the royalties) and secure certain tax
benefits important to them -- all of which comprised the true
consideration for the deal.

At the same meeting, Allen and Colman

agreed to give Respondent their Affidavits to this effect, and did
prepare and execute said Affidavits shortly thereafter (see Ex. 27,
28).

At the same April 15, 1983 meeting, Colman also indicated his

willingness, after consulting further with Allen, to sign a Waiver
and Release to permit Miller (for their mutual benefit) to purchase
the Anderson Ranch after June 18 and on or before July 2, 1983.
April 19, 1983, Colman signed the Waiver and Release (Ex. 10).
(F. 44-48, 50; Tr. 254, 320, 323-325, 485, 1187-1189, 1202-1206)

On

-11On April 18, 1983, Respondent Miller called Archer and offered
to pay $650,000.00 to the Appellants for the Anderson Ranch under the
Option.

On April 20, 1983, Archer called Miller back and informed

him of the Appellants1 rejection of Miller's offer, indicating that
Appellants did not want to sell the property.

Late in April of 1983,

Archer and Wolfe attempted to persuade Colman to exercise his option
rights under paragraph 4.a. of the Real Estate Contract, so that
Archer, Wolfe and Colman could cut Respondent Miller out and sell the
property to a third party (See Ex. 2, 56 and 74). They were
subsequently advised by Allen, however, that the Waiver and Release
which Colman had signed made such an attempt to prevent Respondent
from acquiring the ranch unlawful.

(F. 51, 52; Tr. 259-261, 262,

320, 823-825, 863-868)
On May 16, 1983, Plaintiff filed this action against the Appellants and a lis pendens against the Anderson Ranch.
1983, the Appellants filed their Answer.

On June 24,

Appellants filed their

Third-Party Complaint against Colman on June 30, 1983.

(F. 53)

On July 1, 1983, Fillmore met with E. Craig Smay at the latter's
office in Salt Lake City and tendered to Smay, as Appellants1 attorney, Respondent's cashier's check to the Appellants for $650,000.00
(Ex. 13). At said meeting the attorneys modified and signed a
Delivery of Check and Motion and a stipulated Order (Ex. 14), with
the express understanding that the check would be deposited in a
Court-supervised, interest-bearing account and that
accrued interest shall be determined by the Court".

!l

ent itlement to
Later that same

day Fillmore filed said Delivery of Check and Motion and the Order
with the trial court and deposited the check with the clerk of the

-12court.

Respondent exercised the Option without any objection or

protest being made by Colman either before or since.

(F. 54-58, Tr.

329, 392-397)
The Appellants have enjoyed possession and all rights of ownership of the Anderson Ranch since Respondent's July 1, L983 tender of
the $650,000.00.

The Appellants have executed leases with third

parties for the use of the Anderson Ranch to run cattle on the
property.

All rents paid under such leases have been received by the

Appellants.

Respondent, on the other hand, has received no rents or

income, nor has he had any other commercial benefit, from the
Anderson Ranch since his tender of $650,000.00 on July 1, 1983; nor
has he had the use of the $650,000.00 since then.

What limited and

sporadic recreational use Respondent has had of the ranch, both
before and after his tender offer, has been without objection by the
prior owners or Appellants and similar to that historically enjoyed
by many others in the area.

(F. 67, 68; Tr. 216-218, 223-229,

275-280, 288-291, 303, 358-359, 507, 522)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
OPTION EXERCISED BY RESPONDENT WAS SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION AND, THEREFORE, COULD NOT BE REVOKED BY APPELLANTS.
A. The Option was but one important document among several
related and interdependent documents which were negotiated,
drafted and executed as one composite agreement with mutual,
overlapping considerations.
B. The recital in the Option regarding "$5,000.00 and
other good and valuable consideration11 was simply legal shorthand for the actual consideration exchanged between the parties
for the total transaction. The parties never intended that
Colman pay $5,000.00 for the Option.
C. Because the Option was supported by sufficient consideration, it was legally irrevocable for the term thereof. More-

-13over, Appellants are estopped by their own actions to now deny
the Option's validity.
II. RESPONDENT HAS NOT ARGUED, NOR DID THE TRIAL COURT FIND, THAT
THE TOTAL, INTERRELATED DEAL BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS A LOAN SECURED
BY A MORTGAGE, PER SE, BUT ONLY THAT THE INTERDEPENDENT TRANSACTIONS
WERE THE ROUGH TUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT" THEREOF AND ONLY FOR PURPOSES
OF ILLUSTRATING THE TRUE CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DEAL AND THE OPTION,
IN PARTICULAR. THUS, APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS' WITH RESPECT TO THE
STANDARD OF PROOF AND EVIDENCE OF MARKET VALUE REQUIRED TO SHOW A
MORTGAGE LOAN ARE IRRELEVANT TO THIS CASE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED PAROL EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN THE
PARTIES' INTENT CONCERNING THE TERMS AND PURPOSES OF CERTAIN WRITTEN
DOCUMENTS.
A. Parol evidence may be received to determine if a
contract is integrated. And if the contract is not integrated,
parol evidence is admissible even if it varies the terms of the
contract.
B. The reference in the Option to "$5,000.00 and other
good and valuable consideration" was a mere recital, not a
"contractual" expression of the consideration. Parol evidence
is therefore admissible to explore the true consideration
supporting the Option.
C. Even if the pertinent contracts were individually
integrated, the admission of parol evidence in this case did not
change the terms, validity or effects of the Option or the other
agreements, but only served to explain the parties' true
intentions in the context of the total, unified transaction.
D. With respect to parol and other evidence admitted, the
relative credibility of the respective witnesses was important
to the trial court's decisions.
IV. THE OPTION IN ITS FINAL FORM WAS NOT AN "EXTENSION" OF A PRIOR
BONA FIDE OPTION AGREEMENT AND, IN ANY EVENT, WAS SUPPORTED BY
ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION.
V. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED COLMAN'S HANDWRITTEN NOTES
INTO EVIDENCE FOR A LIMITED PURPOSE, AND ANY CONCERN REGARDING THEIR
ALLEGED INCOMPLETENESS GOES ONLY TO THE WEIGHT OF SUCH EVIDENCE,
PARTICULARLY WHERE THE COURT DID NOT REST ITS DECISION ON THE SAME.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED
TO THE ACCRUING INTEREST ON THE TENDER SUM DEPOSITED WITH THE CLERK
OF THE COURT AFTER APPELLANTS WRONGFULLY REPUDIATED SAID TENDER AND
RETAINED POSSESSION OF THE RANCH.

-14ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION:

APPELLANTS' BURDEN OF PROOF ON APPEAL,

Determining the admissibility of evidence is strictly within the
trial court's discretion and the Supreme Court will not disturb that
decision absent abuse of discretion.
Inc., Utah. 682 P.2d 832 (1984).

Barson v. E. R. Squibbs & Sons,

In the event that the trial court

did abuse its discretion, the Supreme Court may reverse the lower
court only if the evidence admitted was prejudicial.

In Stagmeyer v.

Leatham Bros., Inc., 20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). the Court
explained that where there was no likelihood that the testimony in
question had any substantial bearing on the outcome of the trial
(i.e., harmless error), it was not a cause for reversal.

Prejudicial

error occurs when the trier of fact relied on the admitted evidence
and no other evidence exists to support the decision except that
evidence erroneously admitted.
With respect to determining the relative credibility of
witnesses, the Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the primacy of
the finder of fact in Security State Bank v. Broadhead, 52 Utah Adv.
Rep. 36, 37 (1987) :
"Debtor's assertion that he did not receive notification of
the sale rests on the position that debtor's testimony was more
credible than that of bank's witnesses. The trial court was the
proper forum for the resolution of this issue. In order to
successfully attack a factual finding of the trial court, an
appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings and then demonstrate that even [when viewed] in
the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is ~
insufficient to support the findings. (Emphasis added.) "Scharf
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)."
As stated by the Court in its recent decision in Adam v<( Gubler,
49 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 18 (1986), regarding the recent amendment to
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a):

-15M

Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
(Emphasis added.)
This principle is particularly critical in a case such as this,
where the trial court specifically found that

ff

The demeanor of all

the witnesses was significant to the Court during this trial.11
(F. 33)

I.

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT

THE OPTION EXERCISED BY RESPONDENT WAS SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE
CONSIDERATION AND, THEREFORE, COULD NOT BE REVOKED BY APPELLANTS.
A.

The Option was but one document among several related and

interdependent documents which were negotiated, drafted and executed
as one composite agreement with mutual overlapping considerations.
The trial court found that the Limited Partnership Agreement,
the Purchase Contract, the Special Warranty Deeds and the Option were
all parts of one unified, interdependent transaction.
15)

(F. 7, 8, 9,

Frank Allen testified that the Option was executed by Archer and

Wolfe on the same day they and Colman executed the Purchase Contract,
the Limited Partnership Agreement and the original Special Warranty
Deed to the Appellants.

John Archer's wife, Elizabeth Archer, signed

the Option later that same day or the next day.

Allen testified that

he had been instructed to prepare documents encompassing the total
transaction (the limited partnership, real estate contract, deed and
option to repurchase), but to give them different dates so as to
oblige the Appellants with a paper trail for certain tax benefits.
Allen testified that the parties executed the documents either on
October 15, 1981 (the date of Ex. 3) or November 9, 1981 (the date of

-16Ex. 4) and, most likely, on the latter,
788, 812-816)

(Tr. 61-63, 76, 114,

Allen's testimony about the unified nature of the

subject transaction is corroborated

in nearly all material respects

by the Affidavit of William Colman (Ex. 28, paragraphs 2-6) and, to a
lesser extent, in Colman1s later deposition.

(Tr* 916)

In this same context it is noteworthy that all of the original
documents treating the Anderson Ranch contain the same error in the
legal description (Township 10 South, instead of North).
Ex. 4, 5 and 8.)

(See

The first documents to contain the correct legal

description are the Special Warranty Deeds marked Exhibits 6 and 7.
They were prepared and executed after Frank Allen's receipt of the
preliminary title report (Ex. 64), which is dated November 15, 1981,
and which Randy Cowdin, an employee of Northern TitLe Company,
testified was mailed to Mr. Colman within a week after November 15,
1981.

(F. 23, Tr. 170-177, 205-214, 1075-1078)

A careful comparison

of the duplicate Exhibits "A" attached to both Special Warranty Deeds
(Ex. 6, 7) with the legal description contained

in the preliminary

title report (Ex. 64) discloses that the Exhibits "A" to Exhibits 6
and 7 are photocopies of the legal description contained in the title
report.

This suggests that the documents with the incorrect legal

description (including the Option) were prepared and executed prior
to receipt of the November 15 preliminary report, and that the
revised deeds were prepared and executed subsequent to the receipt of
that report.
Then there is the issue of John Archer's check (Ex. 23), the
original payment under the Limited Partnership Agreement to Owanah
Oil in the amount of $50,000.00.

Although the check is dated October

-1715, 1981, the back of the check indicates that it was deposited
November 10, 1981, the day after the apparent November 9 execution of
the Purchase Contract.

The testimony at trial was unyieldingly

consistent that in the Fall of 1981 Bill Colman was faced with huge
debts and other financial problems concerning his brine operations.
Colman had every incentive to cash any check he received from any
source immediately, so that those funds could go directly into the
brine operations.

(Tr. 550, 911, 972)

So, if he received a check

for $50,000.00 to Owanah on October 15, reasonable men must ask why
he would have waited almost four weeks before depositing the same?
It is far more likely that he received the check on November 9, the
same day all of the other original documents were executed (and when
Appellants were secured by the Purchase Contract on the ranch), and
that he deposited it the next day.

All of the other checks received

by Colman from Appellants on the limited partnership and the ranch
appear to have been deposited within a day or two after Colman
received them.
Frank Allen testified that he would never have permitted Colman
to execute the other documents, particularly the Purchase Contract
and the Special Warranty Deed, until he had made certain that Colman
was protected by a valid option to repurchase the Ranch.

This con-

stitutes one more reason why the Option was executed by the parties
on the same day as the Purchase Contract, the original Special
Warranty Deed and the Limited Partnership Agreement:
1981.

November 9,

(Tr. 65, 69, 71, 936)
Appellants' testimony that they executed the Option on January

4, 1982 (Tr. 760-764), is even contradicted by their own pleadings.

-18In their Third-Party Complaint against Colman, paragraph 4, they
allege with respect to the Option:
"Following the said purchase, in March, 1982, Third-Party
Defendant approached the Third-Party Plaintiffs and solicited an
option to repurchase the property.81 (Emphasis added,)
Lastly, if the Solar Chemical investment and the Anderson Ranch
purchase by the Appellants were truly separate deals consummated at
different times for different purposes, common sense dictates that
Colman would have sought the maximum sales price on the Anderson
Ranch, not the mere $250,000.00 which the paper work suggests he
accepted.

Marcellus Palmer's appraisal (Exhibit 59) indicates that

the fair market value of the Anderson Ranch in 1971 (10 years before
the Appellants' purchase) was $427,000.00 (assuming zoning approval
for development, which Archer himself contemplated).

Moreover,

Colman suggested securing the original deal for $600,000.00 with the
Anderson Ranch.

(See Ex. 1.)

Colman, at least, must therefore have

believed that it had a value of $600,000.00 (or, for that matter,
$650,000.00 since he was willing to pay that much under the Option).
(Tr. 644)

If Colman truly intended to sell the property outright for

the best price, one reasonably would have expected him to at least
test the water with Respondent, whom he knew was very interested in
obtaining the ranch; but he never even solicited a bid from the
Miller family or anyone else.

(Tr. 638-639, 945)

We now know that

Miller just one year later was willing to pay $650,000.00 for the
Ranch.

It stretches the credulity of any reasonable man to accept

Appellants' position that the Solar Chemical investment, the Anderson
Ranch sale and the Anderson Ranch option were three separate and
independent transactions, particularly where the original sales price

-19of the Ranch for Appellants was only $250,000.00 and the repurchase
price for Colman only one and one-half (1-1/2) years later was set at
$650,000.00,
The only reasonable interpretation of these several transactions
between Colman and the Appellants is the one found by the Court:
they collectively comprised one deal with the purpose of getting
Colman $500,000.00 for his brine operation and providing Appellants
with the security of the Anderson Ranch, certain tax benefits and a
variety of other incentives; and, but for a guaranteed option right,
Colman would never have signed the deeds and other agreements.
Findings 15, 17, 30, 31.)

(See

These findings were based on ample,

credible evidence and should be affirmed.
B.

The recital in the Option regarding "$5,000,00 and other

good and valuable consideration" was simply legal shorthand for the
actual consideration exchanged between the parties for the total
transaction.

The parties never intended that Colman pay $5,000.00

for the Option.
It is elementary that the Option is presumed to be supported by
valid consideration by virtue of its own language ("in

consideration

of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars [$5,000.00] and other good and
valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged").
As explained in Chopot v. Foster, 318 P.2d 976 (Wash. 1957), such
words as "for value received" in a simple written instrument create a
presumption establishing a prima facie case of sufficient
consideration to support the instrument.

The burden then shifts to

the Appellants to prove their own affirmative defense of failure of
consideration.

State Ex rel. Ludwick v. Bryant. 697 P.2d 858 (Kan.

-201985); W. L, Scott, Inc. v. Madras Aerotech, Inc., 653 P.2d 791
(Idaho 1982).

Their burden is to show that there was a complete

absence of any valid consideration to support the Option.
It was Frank Allen's testimony that the $5,000,00 was never to
be paid in the first place - that it was only window dressing on the
Option, a standard recital of consideration given and acknowledged as
having been received, an arbitrary number chosen by Allen as a
shorthand codification of some of the benefits and "other good and
valuable consideration11 received by Archer and Wolfe in the unified
transaction.

(Tr. 64)

(See also Colman's Affidavit.)

The "other

good and valuable consideration" sufficient to support and validate
the Option arises from the fact that the whole deal between Archer,
Wolfe and Colman (namely, the limited partnership, the real estate
purchase and the option) was a unified transaction with multiple,
overlapping considerations.
Archer and Wolfe never considered these to be separate transactions.

The reality behind the sophisticated documentation, as

confirmed by Frank Allen's testimony and Bill Colman's Affidavit
(paragraphs 2-6), is that they advanced Colman $500,000.00 for his
brine operation in return for which they hoped, if Colman exercised
the Option, they would get their $500,000.00 back plus a $150,000.00
premium, or, if he failed to pay, they had title to the ranch—all in
addition to the Limited Partnership royalties and various tax
benefits.

(Tr. 170, 373-379, 739, 788, 796, 804, 812-816, 819, 822,

842, 846, 848, 1007)
The issue of paying the $5,000.00 may never have come up until
it became apparent to Archer and Wolfe that they could possibly make

-21a greater profit by selling the property to someone else or
developing it.

(Tr. 500, 515-516, 842, 846, 858-860)

Archer and

Wolfe could easily have withheld the $5,000.00 from the $250,000.00
they paid for the ranch; but they did not.

Colman testified at trial

that he never felt he actually owed the $5,000.00, though he probably
would have paid it just to get Archer and Wolfe off his back if he
had had the money.

Frank Allen also testified that Colman did not

owe the $5,000.00 and that he told him so.

(Tr. 578, 924, 1006-1009)

(See also Colman1s Affidavit, paragrahs 6-7.)

John Clay and John

Miller testified that both Colman and Allen emphatically expressed
the same positions at their April 15, 1983 meeting.

(Tr. 1175-1181,

1202-1210)
Frank Allen testified that the initial draft of the (one-year)
option agreement also had the $5,000.00 consideration recited therein.

(Tr. 152, 154-156)

This flatly contradicts Appellants1 and

Colman's inconsistent testimony that the $5,000.00 was inserted in
the final draft of the (1-1/2-year Option as a result of Appellants1
interest calculations and negotiations with Colman relating to the
additional 6 months.

(Tr. 510-513, 558-568, 578, 628-630, 634-635,

760-764, 819, 847, 942, 1009-1010: See also Ex. 28)

Moreover, the

not-quite-consistent testimony of Archer, Wolfe (and Colman) at trial
is in direct contradiction to Appellants1 Third Party Complaint,
wherein they allege at paragraph 4:
"Following the said purchase, in March, 1982, Third-Party
Defendant approached the Third-Party Plaintiffs and solicited an
option to repurchase the property. Third-Party Plaintiffs
offered Third-Party Defendant such an option for the price of
S5 ,000.00, calculated by reference to the amount of interest
which would accrue on the sum paid by Third-Party Plaint iffs to
the property during the additional period they were asked to

-22hold the property at Third-Party Defendant's disposal.
(Emphasis added.)
According to the great weight of authority, even "a nominal
consideration for an option is sufficient.11
Utah 424, 186 P. 437, 438 (1919).

Thomas v. Johnson, 55

This corresponds to the

traditional "peppercorn11 of the common law.

Moreover, ,BIf the

consideration for the purchase of the property is adequate, the
consideration of the option to purchase, however small, is binding.81
(Emphasis added.) ^d[. at 438.

In Thomas, $1.00 was given as

consideration for an option to purchase land for a purchase price of
$6,500.00.

Although the $1.00 consideration was nominal, the

$6,500.00 purchase price was substantial and, thus, the option was
held to be binding.

The court reasoned that "to hold otherwise would

be to destroy the efficacy of contracts that are made daily in the
course of real estate, mining, and other business pursuits.11

j[d. at

438.
Where one of two considerations for a contract is for any reason
insufficient, but not illegal, the other consideration, if sufficient, will suffice to uphold the contract.

Luther v. National Bank

of Commerce, 98 P.2d 667 (Wash. 1940); U.S. v. Schaefer, 319 F.2d 907
(9th Cir. 1963).

Nor is consideration measured only in terms of

money value equivalent.

Gorgozo, Inc. v. Utah State Road Commission,

553 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 1976).

Although Mr. Colman never paid

$5,000.00 for the Option, the "other good and valuable consideration,f
was provided in the form of substantial tax benefits, royalties, the
potential 20% premium on Appellants1 over-all investment and the
deeds to the ranch--any one of which certainly exceeds the minimum
requirement for nominal consideration.

-23In both Commuter Development Investment v. Granlich, 279 N.W.2d
394 (Nebraska 1979), and Gerald Elbon, Inc. v. Seegren, 338 N.E.2d
626 (Illinois 1978), the courts held that sufficient consideration
for an option was supplied solely by the original sales transaction
of which the subsequent repurchase option was a part.

If the option

for repurchase is reserved as part of the sales transaction, that
transaction will supply the consideration required for the option.
77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, §48.
In Tilton v. Sterling Coal & Coke Co., 28 Utah 173, 77 P. 758,
760 (1904), the Court found that when a lessee, in connection with
his lease, is also given an option to purchase the leased premises,
the lease agreement is sufficient consideration to support the
option, and the lessor cannot withdraw the option before its term
expires.

This was true even though the option did not specify the

consideration that was given for it.

The Court reasoned that lease

payments made to the optionor constituted sufficient consideration
for the option as well.

This case reiterates the Court's

longstanding view that very little consideration is needed in order
to make an option binding and, also, that the consideration need not
be precisely identified.
Where the sale of land involves several connected instruments
constituting one composite transaction, as in this case, they must be
construed together and not as separate independent purchases or
transactions.

77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, §60.

Mitchell v.

Lawson, 444 S.W. 2d 192 (Texas 1969) and Soukop v. Snyder, 709 P.2d
109 (Hawaii 1985) both stand for the principle that with one or more
contemporaneous agreements between the same parties, one agreement

-24can supply consideration for another.

See also Restatement (Second)

of Contracts, §80 (1981).
In the present case, the limited partnership investment/Ranch
purchase/option to repurchase transaction must be viewed as a whole
and the consideration which supported the entire transaction will
also support the Option.

Allen and Colman testified that Colman used

all the resources available to him to get the $500,000,.00.

And in

using the Anderson Ranch, which was owned by Royalty Investment
Corp., he would never have sold it without first securing the right
to reacquire it.
C.

Because the Option was supported by sufficient consider-

ation, it was legally irrevocable for the term thereof.

Moreover,

Appellants are estopped by their own actions to now deny the Option 1 s
validity.
As Appellants1 brief emphasizes, the Option could only be
withdrawn by Appellants giving Colman and/or Respondent a written
notice of intent to .withdraw and then only if there was no original
consideration to support the Option.
Co. , supra.

Tilton v. Sterling Coal & Coke

See also Whitworth v. Enitai Lumber Co., 220 P.2d 328,

330 (Washington 1950).

Here we have an abundance of consideration,

outlined in great detail supra, which rendered the Option irrevocable
through July 2, 1983.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel can also be used as a substitute for consideration in order to make the option binding and
irrevocable.

Any individual who has made a promise which that

individual should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee or a third person, and which does produce

-25such action or forbearance, is estopped to deny or repudiate the
promise should the promisee or some third party suffer detriment
thereby.

Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah

1980) . These essential elements of promissory estoppel are also
outlined in Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 90(1) (1981).
In the present case, Appellants promised Colman that he would
have a valid option for eighteen (18) months.

Colman had a right to

rely on the consideration language, the acknowledgement of receipt in
the Option and on Appellants1 related promise (and so did Respondent,
as Colman1s assignee), and the Appellants should reasonably have expected such reliance.

(F. 27)

Nowhere in the Option itself does one

find any reference to potential revocation by Appellants.

Colman

relied to his detriment on the Appellants1 promises and on the Option
as executed by giving Appellants their deeds to the Anderson Ranch,
and the Respondent by paying for an assignment of the Option.

The

Appellants should be estopped from now denying the Option's
validity.

II.

RESPONDENT HAS NOT ARGUED, NOR DID THE TRIAL COURT FIND,

THAT THE TOTAL, INTERRELATED DEAL BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS A LOAN
SECURED BY A MORTGAGE, PER SE, BUT ONLY THAT THE INTERDEPENDENT
TRANSACTIONS WERE THE ROUGH "FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT'1 THEREOF AND ONLY
FOR PURPOSES OF ILLUSTRATING THE TRUE CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DEAL AND
THE OPTION, IN PARTICULAR.

THUS, APPELLANTS1 ARGUMENTS WITH RESPECT

TO THE STANDARD OF PROOF AND EVIDENCE OF MARKET VALUE REQUIRED TO
SHOW A MORTGAGE LOAN ARE IRRELEVANT TO THIS CASE.

-26Appellants devote a large part of their brief to the narrow issue of whether their transaction with Colman was a "secured loan11.
Respondent asserts that the entire discussion in Section III.C. of
Appellants' brief is irrelevant.

The Court may well determine that

the total transaction and the parties1 rough intention was, in its
essence, a type of secured loan, but neither Respondent nor
Appellants asked the trial court to reform all of the documents as a
mortgage loan per se or to grant either Respondent or Appellants
appropriate deed and mortgage-type remedies pursuant thereto; nor did
the Court rest its decision on any finding of a secured loan per se
(contrary to Appellants1 apparent assertions).

Such an extreme

result was not necessary because Respondent asked the trial court
only to recognize the reality behind the original documents (i.e., a
unified and totally interdependent transaction - aLl of which was
negotiated, agreed upon and executed at the same time) to show that
the various documents evidencing this unified transaction furnish
overlapping and mutually sufficient consideration for each other and
the Option, in particular.

And the Court so found,

(Findings 7-9,

15) (See discussion in Section I.A. supra.)
Appellants1 argument concerning a secured loan is apparently intended, in part, to impose a higher standard of proof on Respondent's
case -- the "clear and convincing evidence standard", instead of a
simple preponderance of the evidence.

But the "clear and convincing"

standard is applicable only to strictly oral contracts for specific
performance or to prove that an absolute conveyance is actually a
mortgage.

(See McCormick on Evidence, §340, 2d ed. , 1972.) Neither

situation is applicable here.

But see Conclusion 16.)

-27By attempting to put their reformation argument in Respondent's
mouth, Appellants strain not only to increase Respondent's burden of
proof, but also to divert the Court's attention to another matter not
strictly necessary to the trial court's decision:

the question of

whether the Appellants paid inadequate consideration for the ranch
(an element of proof for their mortgage reformation theory) and their
related claim of the Court's inappropriate reliance on the Palmer
appraisal (Exhibit 59). But the trial court made no specific finding
as to the market value of the ranch, nor did it expressly rely on the
appraisal.

(Nonetheless, it is instructive that Colman offered the

ranch as security for the whole $600,000.00 contemplated by Ex. 1,
and was willing to pay a $650,000.00 purchase price under the Option.
Respondent indicated his willingness to pay $650,000.00 for it just
one year later (November 2, 1982) and Appellants turned down his
offer in April, 1983.

And there was no showing that a developmental

zoning change was unobtainable from Cache County.)

But again,

Respondent must reiterate that such an exercise is totally irrelevant
because neither party argued, nor did the trial court ever conclude
(nor rely upon the theory), that the documents in question should be
equitably reformed as a note and mortgage and enforced as such.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED PAROL EVIDENCE TO

EXPLAIN THE PARTIES' INTENT CONCERNING THE TERMS AND PURPOSES OF
CERTAIN WRITTEN DOCUMENTS.
A.

Parol evidence may be received to determine if a contract is

integrated.

And if the contract is not integrated, parol evidence is

admissible even if it varies the terms thereof.

-28Two recent cases by this Court re-emphasize the narrow
exclusionary application of the parol evidence rule.

In Union Bank

v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), the Court stated:
"The parol evidence rule as a principle of contract
interpretation has a very narrow application. Simply stated,
the rule operates in the absence of fraud to exclude
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or representations
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an
integrated contract. . . Therefore, a court must first determine
whether the writing was intended by the parties to be arT"
Integration. In resolving this preliminary question of Tact,
l>arol evidence, indeed any relevant evidence, is admissible.
Eie v, St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d at 1194.
"Parol Evidence is admissible to show the circumstances
under which the contract was made or the purpose of which the
writing was executed^ ThTFi is so even after the writing is
determined to be an integrated contract. Admitting parol
evidence in such circumstances avoids the judicial enforcement
of a writing that appears to be a binding integration but in
fact is not.11 (Emphasis added.)
In Colonial Leasing Company of New England, Inc. v. Larsen
Brothers Construction Co., 49 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (1986), the Court
dealt with the admissibility of parol to show that an equipment
contract, structured as a simple lease to avoid certain tax
implications, was in reality (via verbal agreement and industry
custom) a lease with an option to buy.

The Court held as follows:

fl

The Parol Evidence Rule serves to exclude evidence of
terms in addition to those in a written integrated agreement.
!
[T]he rule operates in the absence of fraud to exclude
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or representations
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an
integrated contract.1. . . Because the parol evidence rule
applies only if the writing was intended by the parties to
Represent the full and complete agreement of the parties, the
trial court must first determine whether the writing was
intended to be an integrated agreement^ Union Bank, 707 P.2d at
665; Eie, 638 P.2d at 1194; Bullfrog "Marina, 28 Utah 2d at 266,
501 PT73 at 270."
The Court also held:
"It is the general rule that if an agreement is ambiguous
because of lack of clarity in the meaning of particular terms,

-29it is subject to parol evidence as to what the parties intended
with respect to those terms, . . . We hold that that rule also
applies where the character of the written agreement itself is
ambiguous even though its specific terms are not ambiguous.
Bown y. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah 1984)," (Emphasis
added)
In FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah
1979) , the Court even permitted parol evidence despite an integration
clause in the contract, and held a lease to be a sale. Parenthetically, none of the critical agreements between Appellants and Colman
contain an integration or merger clause.

In the present case, the

Trial Court received parol evidence in order to determine whether the
parties intended the Option to be a separately integrated contract.
The Trial Court found the pertinent documents were not individually
integrated, but rather, were all elements of a multi-faceted,
interdependent series of transactions comprising one deal.

Thus, the

parol evidence rule does not apply in this case and parol is
admissable even to vary the terms of these non-integrated documents.
As Frank Allen testified, the Appellants did not want any reference in the Option to the Carson Sink project (nor any reference in
the Limited Partnership Agreement to the ranch transaction), because
that might have complicated Appellants1 tax objectives.
812-816.)

(Tr. 764,

But such an intent by Appellants, to give the Limited

Partnership Agreement, the Purchase Contract and the Option the
appearance of separate agreements for tax purposes, should not be
permitted to impose judicial "blinders11 on this Court or the trial
court as to the parties1 true intentions.
B.

The reference in the Option to MS5,000.00 and other good and

valuable consideration" was a mere recital, not a "contractual"

-30expression of the consideration.

Therefore, parol evidence is

admissible to explore the true consideration supporting the Option.
Parol evidence which varies or contradicts an unambiguous statement of consideration received in a fully integrated contract is admissible only when the stated consideration is a mere recital.

Mere

recitals of consideration are not conclusive, and parol evidence is
admissible to show the real consideration.

But parol evidence is

inadmissible to vary or contradict consideration which is
unambiguously stated as a substantial term of the contract (i.e.,
"contractual11 in nature), and not as a mere recital.

Wood v.

Roberts, 586 P.2d 405 (Utah 1978); Paloni v. Beebee, 100 Utah 115,
110 P.2d 563 (1941); and Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah
475, 25 P.2d 952 (1933).

See also Section 89B(c), Restatement of.

Contracts (1973) .
In the present case, the Option states that it was granted "in
consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) and
other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged.11

If Appellants consider the $5,000.00 as a

substantial, negotiated term of the Contract, then their
acknowledgement of receipt of the $5,000.00 is binding upon them and
may not be contradicted by parol.
(Tr. 462.)

Respondent so objected

at trial.

If, on the other hand, Appellants consider it a mere

recital, then they cannot object to parol evidence explaining the
true consideration.

Such is the case with the recital language in

the subject Option, and the trial court so found (Findings 20, 21).
Appellants apparently want to expropriate the parol evidence
rule as their sole province.

They claim the rule permits them to

-31show that nx) consideration was paid or given (which contradicts
the express terms of the Option), but would deny Plaintiff the
reciprocal right to show the "other . . . consideration" which was
given for the Option (which would not vary the terms of the
contract).

But extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict a written

statement of consideration received is admissible when the
consideration is stated as a mere recital.

And if parol evidence is

admissible from one party to prove non-payment in such a case, it is
also permissible for the other party to show what unstated
consideration was given pursuant to the language "other good and
valuable consideration".

As the Court in Paloni reasoned:

"A recital of consideration received ... is usually intended
merely as written acknowledgement of the distinct act of
payment. It is there inserted for convenience and the real
consideration is often desired not to be disclosed. Hence, it
is not an embodiment of an act f per se' written, and may be
disputed like any other admission." ~Tld. at 565)
Appellants1 reliance on Rice, Melby Enterprises, Inc. v. Salt
Lake County, 646 P.2d 696 (Utah 1982), is misplaced.

In Rice,

Plaintiff sold land to Defendant for $74,940.62, which consideration
was specified in the deed and was obviously "contractual" in nature
and, therefore, could not be varied by parol.
Lastly, Colman and the Respondent had a right to rely on the
recital of consideration under the circumstances, and Appellants
should be equitably estopped to deny their acknowledgement and the
Option's validity where Colman or Respondent would suffer detriment
thereby.

Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, supra.

Argument on promissory estoppel at
C.

(And see

pp. 24.)

Even if the pertinent contracts were individually integrat-

ed, the admission of parol evidence in this case did not change the

-32terms, validity or effects of the Option, or the other agreements,
but served to explain the parties1 true intentions in the context of
the total, unified transaction.
Appellants cite as their Mparol evidence rule1' what is really
more like a statutory "best evidence rule" (1953 U.C.A. 78-25-16).
The parol evidence rule, with its many sub-rules, historically has
been a creature of the common law.

This presumption that a written

contract contains the full agreement of the parties is very limited.
Among other things, it does not apply where the writing is manifestly
fragmentary, intended to be only a partial integration of the
agreement, ambiguous or uncertain.

Under such circumstances, parol

evidence is admissible to explain the parties' intent.
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983).

Faulkner v.

The Option here discloses

that "other good and valuable consideration" was received, but fails
to identify what that consideration was.

Even if the Court were to

ofind that the Option was integrated within itself, parol evidence is
still admissible to explain what this other consideration was,
because a mere explanation does not by itself vary such a recital.
Wood v. Roberts, supra.

The same principle justifies an inquiry into

the full consideration given to Colman by Appellants for the Special
Warranty Deeds (Exhibits 6 and 7 ) , which also recite "other good and
valuable consideration."

As the Court stated in Wood v. Roberts;

". . . the deed itseLf specified the consideration to be
$10.00 and other good and valuble consideration1, and evidence
is admissible to show what: that consideration was." Jjd. at 407.
f

Significantly, the Court did not limit its holding to recitals
involving only "nominal" consideration, but without qualification
allowed parol evidence to show the true consideration.

In the

-33present case, the parol evidence admitted by the Trial Court on
the issue of consideration did not vary the terms of or alter the
Option or the other agreements.

It merely explained the true

consideration supporting them all.
The Option, Limited Partnership Agreement, Purchase Contract and
Special Warranty Deeds were in no way impaired by the parol evidence
admitted and are still valid and enforceable agreements within the
context of the larger, unified transaction, as the parties intended.
The different effective dates of the various agreements remain
unchanged, because the parol evidence admitted showed only that the
pertinent agreements were executed on the same day.

Appellants argue

that parol evidence has changed the consideration for the Limited
Partnership Agreement and the Purchase Contract; but Appellants are
unclear as to how, even if it were true, this affects any of the
trial courtfs findings.

No party advocates the invalidity of the

Limited Partnership Agreement or the Purchase Contract, and
Respondent does not argue any absence of consideration for them.

The

real issue is the Option 1 s validity, which Respondent asserts rests
on mutual consideration as between the component transactions.
Indeed, Appellants produced no evidence to show that they had lost
anything they had bargained for -- no doubt because they received
everything they were promised (excluding the $5,000.00 only -- which
was not promised).

Appellants1 reference to Tarr v. Hicks, 393 P.2d

557 (Colo. 1964), is not on point because Tarr dealt with the
settlement of a will and a party's efforts to vary the terms of
certain documents in such a way as would effectively destroy them.
No one in this case seeks to destroy or limit the Limited Partnership
Agreement or the Special Waranty Deeds, as Appellants' brief implies.

-34Respondent argues not that they are invalid, but that they are valid
and, more to the point, that the Option is necessarily valid also.
Appellants produced neither law nor evidence establishing any
loss of tax benefits due to Respondent's (or the Court"s) construction of their deal with Colman.

The court below made no findings as

to any tax sham; and Respondent's own expert witness, William Crosby,
could find nothing illegal about the deal's tax structure.

But the

trial court did find the tax structure to be a key to discerning the
deal's true nature.
D.

(Findings 8, 21; Tr. 382, 796, 812-816, 848)

With respect to parol and other evidence, the relative

credibility of the respective witnesses was important to the Trial
Court's decisions.
The trial court's Findings 32 and 33, among others, illustrate
the significant role played by the respective witnesses' credibility
and demeanor in the court's final decisions.

In that regard, it is

necessary to highlight both the importance and the veracity of Frank
Allen's testimony.

He was not only present at

some of the parties'

discussions, and not only prepared all of the pertinent documents for
this complicated transaction, but he is also the only witness who is
in a position to give neutral, disinterested testimony.

He had no

interest in the outcome of this litigation, nor any interest in the
Anderson Ranch.

Moreover, if he had any bias in these proceedings,

one would expect a desire to protect his friend and client, Bill
Colman.

Nonetheless, Allen's testimony on many critical points

directly contradicted Colman's trial testimony.

Now that Colman has

altered his position in several significant respects, Allen is the

-35only contrary voice to Appellants1 convenient reconstruction of the
or ig inal negot iat ions .
Allen's testimony has been consistently mischaracterized by
Appellants1 editorializing, and much of Appellants1 commentary on Mr.
Allen1s testimony comes by way of sweeping generalities, neatly overlooking other aspects of his testimony.

The entire certified tran-

script of Frank Allen's trial testimony leaves little doubt as to his
recollection on the critical factual issues of this case and, unlike
Colman, his recollection has not changed with time.

In this light,

Appellants strongly urge the Court's verbatim review of Allen's trial
testimony.

(Tr. 38-215, 1005-1030)

Pertinent excerpts from the

transcript of Frank Allen's trial testimony which are particularly
supportive of the trial court's findings include:

Tr. 54, 57-58, 66,

133 (value of the Ranch); Tr. 44-46, 93-95 (Allen's instructions);
Tr. 61-62 (spacing the dates of the documents); Tr. 64, 154-156,
1009-1010 (the source of the $5,000.00 consideration figure); Tr. 86,
87, 185 (Allen's work on the Affidavits); Tr. 68, 71, 114, 160, 166,
170, 177 (interdependence of the Solar Chemical, Anderson Ranch and
Option deals); Tr. 152, 1021 (the one year option); Tr. 64, 113-114,
141, 160, 1007 (the "other consideration"); and Tr. 65, 69, 76, 162,
170, 205-214, 1021 (concurrent execution of the original
agreements).
Frank Allen testified that he prepared the documents pursuant to
instructions received at various times from Archer, Wolfe and Colman,
and that he participated in meetings with all of them concerning
those same documents.

Allen has been a member in good standing of

the Utah Bar for more than 35 years with a great deal of real

-36property experience (Tr. 38), and his testimony reflected an
excellent knowledge of the law pertaining to real estate documentso
Mr. Allen testified honestly to the best of his recollection, as a
matter of duty and in consequence of the oath under which he gave
that testimony, regardless of whom it may have helped or hurt, his
own client not excluded•
By way of contrast, the Court should also consider the actions
and testimony of Bill Colman.

As indicated by the testimony of John

Miller, John Clay, Respondent, Fillmore and Allen, in addition to
Colman1s own Affidavit and personal notes, Colman1s statements were
consistent with Allen's recollection of events until this action was
filed.

Then Colman1s recollection began to change.

(Tr. 1069)

Colman1s Affidavit, which was admitted by the Court for all purposes,
and which Frank Allen testified was the product of a lengthy meeting
and close review by both of them in his office in April 1983, is a
very compelling document, and one which directly contradicts much of
Colman 1 s trial testimony.

(Tr. 86-87)

It was also prepared and

signed at a time when Colman1s recollection of events was much
fresher than when he testified at trial 2-1/2 years later.
Colman1s testimony was also impeached directly by his own notes*
(See Exhibit 54, wherein Colman writes regarding the "Archer and
Wolfe/Colman11 deal, such interesting notations as "Interest is his
fundamental consideration;" "these are purely counterfeit complaint like the $5,000.00; Purchase of Land never intended to be bona fide
sale - gimmick to satisfy E;" "Shylock;" "it was a loan to be collateralized by pledging the Ranch - $500,000.00 at 20% for 18 months."
In Exhibit 55, dated July 14, 1982, Colman writes, among other
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-38Ranch a year after the Option was to expire, or whether it was
turning on his old friend Miller, first, to discuss the advantages of
collaborating with Archer and Wolfe to defeat Miller's interests in
April, 1983 or, secondly, to pick up a mere $5,000,00 from Archer and
Wolfe (and whatever side deals they may have made) to defeat Miller's
interest in July, 1984, his surprising flip-flop with respect to his
private interests and his testimony is remarkable.

So is the steady

stream of direct contradictions in his trial testimony, as measured
against his prior Affidavit, his Deposition, statements made by him
to the Respondent, John Miller, Clay and Fillmore, and his personal
notes.

His testimony in this case was impeached on almost all fronts

and the trial court had ample basis to reject his testimony.
As for Appellants, their motivation in this matter appears quite
simple:

how to make the most money.

Appellants1 primary motivation

has been to avoid the Option so that they could deal independently
with third parties.

They had already driven an extremely hard bar-

gain with Bill Colman in 1981, extracting multiple concessions when
Colman had his back against the wall (Tr. 744), including split profits and an overriding royalty on the brine operation and a potential
twenty percent (20%) profit on their total investment of $500,000.00,,
Yet they were determined to seek yet additional profits at Miller's
expense by repudiating the Option.

On two separate occasions they

tried to use Colman to defeat Miller's right to the ranch, but both
attempts failed because they were unlawful.

In short, greed has been

Appellants' animating spirit from start to finish and they have never
viewed contractual obligations as any kind of impediment.

Their
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The witnesses acknowledged

-*

that part of the ea;:^; negotiations

-40included an agreement (never produced and not before the Court) to
give Colman a one-year option on the Ranch with a purchase price of
$600,000.00.

There was no testimony by any witness at trial that the

document was ever signed.
was not executed.

To the contrary, Allen confirms that it

The reason for this was acknowledged by all:

prior to execution of the option (and the other key contracts),
Colman determined that he needed a longer option term, so the parties
agreed to an eighteen-month option.

The only changes he made from

the original draft to the final Option were Appellants' promise to
give Colman an extra six (6) months and Colman1s promise to pay an
extra $50,000.00 if he exercised it.
It is specious for Appellants to argue that a mere draft document, which was never executed by any party, somehow constituted an
agreement for which specific consideration was given.

If it was

never entered into, how could any consideration have been given for
it?

And if it was never a valid, binding agreement because no one

signed it, and no consideration was ever given for it, how can anyone
now argue that the final product of the parties' negotiations, which
included an eighteen-month option, must somehow reflect "additional"
consideration?

We simply are not dealing with the extension of a

fully executed, legally binding, prior agreement.

Appellants' novel

theory, carried to its logical conclusion, would require parties to
any final contract to show original and additional consideration for
each successive draft of their agreement up to and including the
executed version.

But how can one extend an option which was

never granted in the first place?

Respondent knows of no law

supporting that proposition, and Appellants cite none.
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-42edit those copies, of the individual notes, that he stapled them
according to his best judgment concerning their apparent relationship
to each other, that he and his firm possessed copies of no other
notes than those produced at trial, and that the originals were all
returned to Colman with the file.
1187-1188, 1196-1199)

(Tr. 1106-1113, 1145-1161,

There was no evidence adduced by Appellants at

trial to contradict Fillmore's testimony, nor to justify the
gratuitous aspersion in Appellants' brief regarding the possibility
of "mishandling by counsel" or "partisan editing".

Although Colman

was asked by the Court, and counsel for both Respondent and
Appellants, to produce the original notes, he subsequently claimed he
could not locate them (Tr. 975). Thus, the Court correctly accepted
all copies produced by Respondent under the Best Evidence Rule.
Appellants failed to specifically request discovery of any such
notes.

Respondent's counsel understood the verbal pretrial arrange-

ment on documents to cover only the parties' cases-in-chief, not
potential rebuttal material.

These notes were not used in Respon-

dent's case-in-chief, but to rebut Colman's testimony for Appellants'
case when he was cross-examined by Respondent's attorney.

Any undue

surprise was overcome by the several days that Colman and Appellants
had to review the notes after their initial introduction and prior to
Colman's testifying about them.

(Parenthetically, Appellants

introduced documents in their case-in-chief which had not been
previously disclosed to Respondent (Defendants' Exhibits 63 and 65),
although the same had been formally requested by Respondent
previously.)
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-44asserts that he is still entitled to all the accrued interest as a
matter of law.
To grant Appellants the interest on the tender they repudiated,
when they have also had the full commercial benefit of the land for
the entire pendency of these proceedings, would be a grossly unfair
double benefit.

Since Respondent's tender on July 1, 1983, the only

benefit which he has enjoyed from the property has been the same
benefit which he had enjoyed for 20-30 years- -- sporadic recreational
use with permission of the prior owners and Appellants. As
Respondent and Colman testified, this permissive recreational usage
is no different than that which has been enjoyed historically by many
other non-owners on the ranch.

(And even that limited usage by

Respondent abated for more than a year for Miller's L.D.S. mission in
Africa during the pendency of this litigation prior to trial.)
(Finding 68; Tr. 216-217, 230, 303)
The location of a small fishing trailer on the north edge of the
ranch, which was situated there for many years before Appellants acquired title to the land, and which is hardly ever used by Respondent
(Tr. 224-225, 288, 596-597), can by no stretch of the legal imagination constitute "possession" of the 1,840 acre ranch under Pack v.
Hull Development Co., 667 P.2d 39 (Utah 1983), cited by Appellants.
At most, Respondent has enjoyed a permissive license from past and
present owners for limited recreational use in exchange for his
assistance regarding trespassers (the locked gate), fences, etc.
Respondent has had a key to the gate for many years with the owners'
permission (as have the prior owners and Appellants).
could have changed the locks any time they wished.

Appellants
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rerunning cattle on their property -- a far cry from Respondent having
the right to run cattle on his own property without paying rent to
anyone or feeling free to develop the ranch without the risk of later
losing his investment by losing this suit.
In short, Respondent has lost the use of his money during the
pendency of this litigation.
land.

He has had no commercial use of the

And he has had no recreational use beyond what he previously

had and what others have had on a limited basis, and his limited
usage has never been adverse to or without permission of the owners.
Appellants have had the full commercial benefit and ownership of the
land.

They have not been restricted by Mr. Miller in any way from

renting the land to other third parties and have taken all the rents
and profits received from third parties' use of the land since
Respondent's tender of $650,000.00 on July 1, 1983.

As the trial

court found:
"The Defendants have enjoyed possession and all rights of
ownership of the Anderson Ranch since Plaintiff's July 1, 1983
tender of the $650,000.00, The Defendants have executed leases
with third parties for the use of the Anderson Ranch, most
recently with Boyd Munnsf to run cattle on the ranch property.
All rents paid under such leases have been received by the
Defendants.
"In contrast to the Defendants, the Plaintiff has received
no rents or income, nor has he had any other commercial benefit,
from the Anderson Ranch since his tender of $650,000.00 on July
1, 1983; nor has he had the use of his money since then. What
limited and sporadic recreational use Plaintiff has had of the
ranch has been without objection by the owners and similar to
that enjoyed historically by many others in the area."
The statements in Appellants' brief at pages 28-30 that "no use
of the land has been made by Appellants without Respondent's consent"; that Respondent "did on (the ranch) all he would have done had
his ownership been undisputed"; and references to Respondent's "ex-
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If they chose to do no more than lease the land, that was

their decision and even that was more than Respondent could do with
the land during the pendency of this case.

Appellants8 Amended

Answer in the case denies that Respondent has any right to the
Anderson Ranch,

Appellants should not be allowed to profit from

their own wrongful refusal to honor their Option agreement.
Appellants1 startling allegation at page 30 of their brief that,
,f

In the circumstances, it was merely vindictive not to award interest

to Appellants/1

(emphasis added), is demeaning to the trial judge

and without basis in fact.

Judge Call acted with utmost integrity

throughout this lengthy and difficult proceeding.

To impugn his

integrity is an affront to the bench.
Common law and equity require that if a party obligated to sell
land still retains possession and the right to rents and profits, and
refuses and delays the buyer's right to purchase, forcing the buyer
to place funds on deposit with the Court pending settlement of the
action, then that seller is not entitled to the accrued interest on
the deposited funds.

To hold otherwise would give the seller a

double recovery -- i.e., both rents and profits and the interest.
See Resnick v. Goldman, 133 S.2d 770 (Fla. 1961) and Palm Beach
Estates v. Crocker, 143 S. 792 (Fla. 1932), which both held that it
would be inequitable for the seller to collect interest on money
deposited with the Court during the period of litigation when the
seller was responsible for the delay in conveyance of the property.
See also, Rasmussen v. Moe, 292 P.2d 226, 230 (Cal. 1956), where the
buyer placed a deposit of $10,000.00 in Court and the seller refused
to convey land, the buyer was awarded interest on the deposit.
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-50CONCLUSIONS
On appeal, the burden is upon the Appellant to convince the
Court that the trial court committed substantial, reversible error,
not that the Appellant should have won the case.

Brigham v. Moon

Lake Electric Assoc., 470 P.2d 393, at 394 (Utah 1970),

The trial

court's judgment in this case was amply supported by the evidence, is
wholly within the law, and should be affirmed in its entirety,
granting Respondent the specific performance he sought nearly four
(4) years ago, along with the interest accrued on his tender sum
since Appellants' wrongful rejection of the same, and his costs on
appeal.
Respectfully submitted this

of March, 1987.
OLSON & HOGGAN
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT ™ T"T ^ T " < ^ TT'TIAL H T S T E ™ OF THE
STATE Oi
ERNEST J .

UI / i l l ,

AA1

LXi-ILS

t

VlV

THE GOUNll

\-/1

v/ ^"i U i i A-.

MILLER,

VS .

i 1NDINGS 01 1 A«j;

JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH
B. ARCHER, both individually and
as Trustees for t.he ELizabeth
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott
Wolfe Trust No. 7"

:-W

Defendants.

JOHN u . -UV^ULK and L i _ l ^ A b h l n
B. ARCHER. r>otn i n d i v i d u a l l y
ds T r u s t e e s f o r t h e E l i z a b e t h
D a l y A r c h e r T r u s t , and Hl'BF r 1
wOLFE. JUDY W. WOLFE, an,: L . . . . .
•vOLFE. J.S T r u s t e e s f o r EJ ; ; 11
'.v.: 1 i" e I r ... s f v
7
Third-Party

WILLlAr-

J.

Civil

No.

21692

Plaintiffs,

COLMAN,

)N ft HOGGAN
IRNEYS AT LAW
WEST CEIVTER

Third-Party

Defendant.
,1

O BOX 5 2 5

4

J

R . : ^ " O H £ - - 3"

.N UTAH 8 4 3 2 '
(11 7 5 2 - 1 5 5 1

^ ? : AUG 1 2 ' 3 3 5
000.*

J003

S£THS.flU£W, Clerk

*!t

fettd*.

Deputy

THIS MATTER having come on for trial before the aboveentitled Court, the Honorable Omer J. Call

District Judge,

presiding and sitting without a jury, on September 18. 19, 20

27

October 3, November 14, and December 17. 1985- and Plaintiff
having been represented by its counsel of record, L. Brent Hoggan
of Olson & Hoggan, and the Defendants having been represented by
their counsel of record, E. Craig Smay. and the Third-Party
Defendant, knowingly, voluntarily and after discussing the same
with the Court, having been represented by himself- and the Court
having heard testimony from witnesses for ail the parties hereto,
and having received and accepted certain exhibits offered by the
parties as evidence in the matter- and the Court having received
trial briefs *£rom counsel for both Plaintiff and the Defendants oi
the primary issues before the Court- and the Court having made an<
entered its written Memorandum Decision herein, and having
reviewed and considered Plaintiff's proposed Findings, Conclusion*
and Judgment and Defendants1 Objections thereo* and being fully
advised in the premises, THE COURT DOES NOW MAKE AND ENTER THE
FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
FINDINGS OF FACT
lo

The real property which is the subject of this action by

Plaintiff for specific performance of a purchase option relating
to said property is a composite of several semi-contiguous parcels
of undeveloped land and appurtenant water rights located Southeast
of Paradise. Utah, comprising in the whole 1840.14 acres, more or
less, primarily used for cattle grazing and recreation, and
generally known and referred to hereinafter as the "Anderson
Ranch". which property is located totally within the boundaries of
Cache County. Utah, and more particularly described as follows
>N & HOGGAN
JRNEYS AT LAW
NEST CENTER
O BOX 5 2 5
iN. UTAH 8 4 3 2 1

Parcel I: The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarterthe South half of the Northeast quarter the Southeast
quarter of the Northwest quarter- the East half of the
Southeast quarter- the Northwest quarter of the Soutnwest

>1)752-1551

00

ri,J»Jlii

-3quarter of Section 26- the North haLf of the
Northwest quarter
the Southwest quarter of the Southeast
quarter of Section 25* the Northeast quarter of the
Northeast quarter- the Northeast quarter of the Southeast
quarter- the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter, the
South haLf of the Southwest quarter of Section 24' the
Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 23* in
Township LO North, Range 3 East. SaLt Lake Base and Meridian
Lots 2, 3 and 4 the Southeast quarter of the Southwest
quarter
the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter* and
the Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 19
Township LO North. Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Mer id ian.
Pa£C_e_l_2; The West half of the Southeast quarter and the
East half of the Southwest quarter of Section 26. Township 1(
North. Range 3 East. SaLt Lake Base and Meridian.
Farce L 3
The Northeast quarter- the Southeast quarter of
the Northwest quarter: the Northeast quarter of the Southwest
quarter• the Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of
Section 19. the East half of the Northeast quarter; and the
North half of the Southeast quarter of Section 30, in
Township 10 North, Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and
Meridian. Also the Southwest quarter of Section 25, and the
Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 26*
Township 10 North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
ParceL 4;
The West half of the Northeast quarter; the
Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter
and the Southeast
quarter of the Southwest quarter; of Section 30, Township 10
North, Range 4 East, SaLt Lake Base and Meridian.
Together with all water rights /apptrrtroaan-fr- to the abovedescribed property.
2.

The Plaintiff

herein, Ernest Junior Miller

"MiiLer"), is a resident of Cache County. Utah.

</

(hereinafter

The Defendants

named herein, both as individuals and as trustees, John D. Archer
(hereinafter "Archer"), Elizabeth B, Archer, Elliott Wolfe
(hereinafter

" W o l f e " ) , Hubert Wolfe and Judy W

residents of Salt Lake County. Utah.
DN&HOGGAN
DRNEYSATLAW

h

t

William J. Colman

Wolfe, are all

The Third-Party

Defendant

(hereinafter "Colman") , is also a
N

7

7

WEST CENTER
' O BOX 5 2 5
AN. UTAH 8 4 3 2 1
01)752-1551

0>J •••«.Jv^' j

resident of SaLt Lake County, Utah.

Miller. Colman, Archer

and Wolfe are men of considerable business experience and acumen
particuarly m

matters of cattle raising and beef fabrication

(Miller), mining, oil and gas (Colman and Archer) and real estat
(Archer, Wolfe and Colman). -Arebtrr and Wolfe are-nieu of
c-cnsrdes^a-b-l-e—&4«^xu^air^IfB^TaTrc e
3.

Colman is a shareholder and President of Royalty

Investment Corporation, also known as Royalty Investment Company
(hereinafter "Royalty11), a Utah corporation.

Most, if not all,

the balance-of .Royalty s stock, is owned by Colman's relatives- ai
the company is. within
w i t n m Colman's
Colman s efl
effective control. Colman acquirt
the Anderson Ranch for Royalty is^^Sir by purchasing E. H. Camerc
and H. C. Anderson's rights (as Buyers) under a June 1961 Contrac
of Sale with LaMar Anderson and Lucille Anderson (as Sellers).
4.

In the late Summer or early Fall of 1981, Colman ap-

proached Defendant Archer for a loan of $750,000.00, money which
Colman urgentLy needed to continue development of the Carson Sini
salt project (certain mineral rights and evaporation ponds used
for commercial salt production located in Nevada),.

Said mineral

project was owned by Owanah Oil Corporation, of which Colman was
President, and was in serious financial trouble due, at least in
part, to excessive precipitation in the past.
5.

Subsequently, Archer advised Colman that Archer and

Wolfe, with whom Archer had discussed Colman1s offer,

were not

interested in a simple Loan and were not interested in investing
;
Colman suggested that Jthsa
A!TOgg^4^aH^-^Q#T €rQfrr5& in any event.

A J*4*

$&&B^&&&?&®. could be secured by the Anderson

Ranch (indicating that Colman. at least, beLieved the ranch nad
that much value).

The possibility of a limited partnership

interest in the Carson Sink salt project was also discussed.
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6.

Based upon these preliminary discussions. Colman had his

long-time attorney, Frank J. Allen, of Salt Lake City

Utah

(hereinafter "Allen"), prepare a document (Exnibit 1) by which
Archer and Wolfe would invest S600.000.00 in a limited partnershi
for the Carson Sink project, which investment Colman would secure

-5with a Trust Deed on the Anderson Ranch.

Said document was

never executed.
7.

Subsequently

and after considering certain tax savings

possibilities with tneir accountants. Archer and WoLfe advised
CoLman that they were only interested in advancing Coiman
$500,000.00 total for his salt project, and this on condition tha
the $500,000,00 be structured to appear by record as an investmen
of $250,000.00 in a Limited partnership on the salt project,
providing tax write-offs for research and development expenses,
and an interest in profits during the Life of the partnership and
an overriding royalty thereafter; and with the other $250,000.00
to be shown as the purchase price for the Anderson Ranch, coupled
with a one-year option in CoLman to reacquire the Ranch for
$600,000.00, which would permit Defendants to treat the differenc
as a capital gain.

Archer, Wolfe and Coiman reached an agreement

in principle on this arrangement, and Defendants accepted Coiman'
suggestion that Allen draw up the necessary papers to document th
deal.
8.

In October and/or November of 1981, Archer, Wolfe and

Coiman met with ALLen at the latterfs office on at least two
separate occasions, first to discuss their agreement and later to
execute the documents prepared by Mr. Allen pursuant to their
instructions.

AiLen was advised by Archer, Wolfe and Coiman that

although the primary purpose of the arrangement was to get
$500,000.00 to Coiman for his salt project, they wanted the deal
structured such that it would appear as three separate
transactions (i.e., the limited partnership, the purchase of the
ft
? K~-^

ranch, and the option back on the ranch), aq_ as—~to~ 1 p. ave * ""pfggfcrra3=E33r^feS^=3^ and secure Archer and Wolfe all the tax
advantages they were seeking.

The structure of the deal was not

so critical to Coiman as securing the $500,000.00 from the
}N & HOGGAN

DRNEYSATLAW
WEST CENTER

»o.BOX525

°

D e f e n d a n t s , as l o n g as he had an o p p o r t u n i t y t o g e t t h e Anderson
Ranch back. The different dates on the various documents were
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largely

irrelevant

t o him.

He was in g r e a t

need of

t h e money and

bd-^Ui

•6-

was willing to use the various resources within his control to
consummate a deal any way he could.
9. Pursuant to the directions received from Archer, Wolfe
and Colman. ALlen prepared the Certificate and Agreement of
Limited Partnership of Solar Chemical Company, for Archer and
Wolfe1s $250,000.00 contribution to the salt project (Exhibit 3?
hereinafter the "Limited Partnership Agreement'1) , the Contract f<
Purchase of Real Property, for the purchase by Defendants of the
Anderson Ranch for $250,000.00 (Exhibit 4, hereinafter the
"Contract'1) , the Special Warranty Deed from Royalty to the
Defendants (Exhibit 5), and an option from Defendants to Colman I
permit him to repurchase the Anderson Ranch for $600,000.00.
Subsequently, the parties agreed to give Colman an option on the
Anderson Ranch for 1-1/2 years for a purchase price of $650,000.(
(Exhibit 8, hereinafter the "Option"). The original one (l)-year
option for $600,000.00 was, never executed by the parties.
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10. The Limited Partnership Agreement establishing Solar
Chemical Company was dated October 15, 1981, as was Archer's
initial check to Owanah Oil Corporation, the General Partner in
Solar Chemical Company, for $50,000.00 (Exhibit 23). Colman was
shareholder and President of Owanah, which company apparently was
within his effective control.
11. The Limited Partnership Agreement provided for periodic
contributions by the Limited Partners. Archer and Wolfe, totallin
$250,000.00, and states that Archer and Woife were each to receiv
a five percent (57o) share in Solar Chemical's net profits over
three (3) years and that each would receive a one-half of one
percent (#&#5%) overriding royalty thereafter on all sodium salts
recovered from the project.
12. The Contract between Royalty (signed by Colman, as
President), as Seller, and Archer, Archer's wife and Wolfe, as th
sole named Trustee of Elliott Wolfe Trust 701 (hereinafter the
"Wolfe Trust"), as Purchasers, was an executory contract for the
sale of the Anderson Ranch to tne Defendants, specifying January
4, 1982 as the closing date. It was dated November 9, 1981.
as was Wolfe's check to Royalty for $100.00 (Exhibit 35).

-713.

The Special Warranty Deed conveying the Anderson Ranch

from Royalty (again signed by CoLman, as President), to the
Defendants was dated January 4, L982 (Exhibit 5 ) . Said Special
Warranty Deed, as well as the Contract and the Option, aLl contair
a scrivinor's error in the legal description of the Anderson
Ranch, mistakenly and unintentionally referencing Township 10
South, instead of Township 10 North, in Parcel 3 thereof.

No

evidence was received (or offered) suggesting that Colman acted
without authority in executing the Contract, the Special Warranty
Deed or subsequent deeds as President .of Royalty Investment
Corporation.
14.

The documents^a^Eax

I 11 In

(x

il i 1^ IJJ Ifru11 T I M

The Option from the Defendants to Colman was dated Marct"

of 1982 (viz, M this

day of March, 1982").

The purpose of

said Option was to allow Colman the right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch on or before July 2, 1983 for $650,000.00.

It was

executed by Archer, Mrs. Archer and Wolfe in their individual and
respective trustee capacities.

Tfaeir eyxrcutriun uf Llie O p t i o n ^ .

coxx-etrprrmts— precisely with liow Lliey took title to the "Anderson
Rinjch--^g<g^^
15.

.y

Q'^anS::frf\

All of the aforereferenced documents, Exhibits 3, 4, 5

and 8, were prepared at or about the same time by Frank Allen,
pursuant to the instructions of the parties, as part of a unified,
integrated transaction.

They were all executed by the parties on

the same date, most likely on or about November 9, 1981, as
indicated on the back of said check.
16.

Although Colman was in debt and had an acute need for

funds to continue his salt project, Archers1 check to Owanah Oil
in the amount of $50,000.00, dated October 15, 1981 (Exhibit 2 3 ) ,
was not cashed by Colman until on or about November 10, 1981, as
indicated on the back of said check.
17.

Colman and his attorney, Allen, required a simultaneous

execution of the documents, particularly the Contract, the
originaL Special Warranty Deed and the Option, in order to assure
)N & HOGGAN
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Anderson Ranch, even though the dates were spaced out for
Defendants1 tax purposes.

The Court finds it probable that

Archer, likewise, was unwilling to part with his first check for
$50,000.00 prior to securing the Defendants' position with a
contract and deed on the Anderson Ranch.

Allen insisted that the
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LimLted Partnership Agreement, Contract and Option be executed
at the same time so that CoLman would not be deeding away the
Anderson Ranch without a right to repurchase the same. Such an
entitlement was always part of the parties1 agreement and
essential to Colman's willingness to enter into the related
transactions. Colman was promised that right to repurchase the
Ranch as part of the total deal and re Lied on that promise in
executing the deed conveying the Ranch to Defendants.
L8. Elliott Wolfe represented to Colman and Allen that he
had authority to sign any agreement for his trust and intended
that his signature bind the trust and that Colman and Allen rely
thereon*, and Colman and ALlen did rely upon his representation ai
signature. Mrs. Archer's signature was secured the same day th«
the other parties signed the Option, or the very next day. The
Option was then delivered by Archer, either that same day or the
next day, to Colman.
19. AlLen never received a copy of the Wolfe Trust agreemer
from Wolfe (nor was it produced at trial) : nor did the other
ostensible trustees to the Wolfe Trust, Hubert Wolfe and Judy
Wolfe, ever notify Colman, Allen or Miller that they objected to
Wolfe's binding the Trust by his signature alone- nor did Wolfe
seriously claim that he lacked authority to bind the Wolfe Trust.
20. The Option reads that it was given to Colman lfin
consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) and
other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged'1. This recital of $5,000.00 and the "other good and
valuable consideration" came from Allen, who had aLso inserted th
same figure in the original, one-year, $600,000.00 option to
Colman. which was never executed. The fictitious $5,000e00
consideration was carried over to the Option (Exhibit 8), which
reflects the parties' agreement to give Colman an option for 1-1/
years for an additional $50,000.00 (total. $650,000.00), wnich
Option was executed.
21. Said $5,000.00 was never intended by the parties to be
paid. It was merely window-dressing which Allen pulled out of th
air and inserted to give credence to the document as part of the
legal shorthand he used for the actual consideration. The
G'J^.
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Defendants acknowledged receipt of the same, even though they
had not actually received $5,000.00, because they all knew it was
not to be paid. The real consideration for the Option consisted
of the flother good and valuable consideration11, which included th<
conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Special Warranty Deed from
Royalty to the Defendants, the $650,000.00 to be paid for the
Anderson Ranch upon exercise of the Option, the Limited
Partnership benefits as to profit sharing and the overriding
royalty, and the various tax benefits accruing to the Defendants
by structuring the total transaction their way. The Court finds
that it was never the intent of the parties at the time the Optioi
was granted that $5,000.00 was the consideration for the Option,
or that the $5,000.00 would, in fact, ever be paid.
22. The Court notes that the Option on its face and by its
terms gives the Defendants no right of revocation. There are no
restrictions on its face as to its assignability by Colman to
third parties, nor is there any language suggesting the Option wa*
strictly personal to Colman.
23. Within a week after November 15, 1981, the date of a
title commitment from Northern Title Company (Exhibit 64), said
report was mailed to Colman or Allen by said title company. This
title report, among other things, disclosed an error in the legal
description of the Anderson Ranch, as set forth in paragraph 13 oi
these Findings. Two Special Warranty Deeds (Exhibits 6 and 7)
were subsequently prepared for the purpose of conveying the
Anderson Ranch from Royalty to the Defendants with the necessary
correction to the legal description (i.e., changing "Township 10
SouthM to "Township 10 North" for Parcel 3). They were dated
January 4, 1982, and recorded by Allen on January 7, 1982. The
new Special Warranty Deed for the Wolfe interest (Exhibit 7) in
the Anderson Ranch was conveyed to "Elliott Wolfe, Trustee of the
Elliott Wolfe Trust No. 701", and so recorded, without any
preference to co-trustees.
24. On January 22, 1982, a Correction of Correction Deed
(Exhibit 45) was executed by Lucille Anderson to Royalty, and
thereafter recorded to correct the error contained in the

0l\ '

r>
bo
-dOli

-10legai description ot the 1980 deed from her and her husband to
Royalty for the Anderson Ranch.
25.
Option.

Colman never paid $5,000.00 to tne Defendants for the
iSleither Archer nor Wolfe ever made any written request

Colman to pay the $5,000.00.

When Archer made his first verbal

inquiry regarding payment of the $5,000.00, which may have been
sometime in March, 1982, Colman told him that he did not believe
he had to pay the $5,000.00.

When Colman contacted Allen, Allen

reaffirmed for him that the $5,000.00 was never intended to be
paid and advised Colman against paying it, inasmuch as the
consideration supporting the total deal was comprised of those
considerations set forth hereinabove at Finding 22.

Allen

consistently advised Colman, Archer, Wolfe and Plaintiff that th<
parties to the Option never intended for Colman to pay the
$5,000.00.
26.

Colman never conceded that he owed the $5,000.00.
The Defendants1 later assertions that Colman!s

non-payment of the $5,000.00 rendered the Option invalid and
unenforceable lacks credibility
Defendants

, This Court finds that

argument is^mortely a •eonv^R-ireQt-^fter—fehetigfat which

th^y-tj-fretH-in, an

fl£teinpt.£^^nv^^^

.

It was never

agreed or intended that Colman was to pay $5,000.00 to the
Defendants.

The number recited was fictitious, which is why the

Defendants signed the Option acknowledging their receipt of that
sum, as well as their receipt of the "other good and valuable
consideration", which phrase circumscribed the true consideration
The Defendants1 testimony as to their purported

for the Option.

negotiations, renegotiations and the calculations which they
allege resulted in the $5,000.00 consideration for the Option is
contradicted not only by Alien's testimony and Colman's Affidavit
but by Defendant's own pleadings (viz., paragraph 4 of their
Third-Party Complaint) .
DN&HOGGAN
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The Defendants represented to Colman and his attorney

that Colman would have a right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch.
Defendants intended that Colman and his attorney should rely on
those representations and upon the sufficiency of the Opt ion,
executed.

as

Colman and his attorney did rely on those

representations and on the Option as executed.

In light of

Defendants1 subsequent repudiation of the Option, that reliance
was to Colman!s detriment.
28.

Archer and Wolfe never visited the Anderson Ranch or tht

Carson Sink salt project until the Spring of 1982.

They never

checked the title to the Carson Sink properties, nor did they evei
verify the water rights appurtenant to the Anderson Ranch, until
the Spring of 1982.

The Defendants never secured title insurance

on the Anderson Ranch.
29.

The overriding royalty rights m the Carson Sink which

the Limited Partnership Agreement states will be assigned to
Archer and Wolfe had not been assigned to them or recorded by then
at the time of trial, four (4) years after the Limited Partnershif
Agreement was executed.

No profits have ever been paid out by

Solar Chemical to Archer or Wolfe.
30.

The price purportedly paid for the Anderson Rancn by

Defendants to Royalty ($250,000.00), and the price which Colman
was to pay Defendants to reacquire the Anderson Ranch under the
Option only eighteen (18) months later ($650,000.00), cannot, as a
matter of reason, stand alone.

The property was professionally

appraised (See Exhibit 59) for $427,240.00 ten (10) years prior to
the sale by Colman to the Defendants.

Moreover, even if the

Anderson Ranch was worth only $250,000.00 on January 4, 1982, the
Court cannot believe that Colman had a reasonable expectation that
the market value of the Anderson Ranch would be 260% of its prior
sales value only 1-1/2 years later (or at any time in between).
)N&HOGGAN
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-12price he could for the ranch at the time, it was admitted that
Colman, who had known for several years that MilLer was interest
in acquiring the Anderson Ranch or an interest therein, never
contacted Miller to see if he would be interested in bidding mot
than $250,000.00 for it. These prices make sense only when viefo
in the context of the layer, unified transaction.,
3L. Although it is not strictLy necessary to its decision,
the Court finds that the $650,000.00 purchase price for Colman1s
exercise of the Option more truly corresponds to a twenty percen
(20%) return on a composite $500,000o00 secured investment by
Defendants in Colman1s salt project for one and one-half (1-1/2)
years. The total transaction was the functional equivalent of a
secured loan ($500,000.00 loaned by Defendants to Colman for 1-1
years at 207o interest, secured by the Anderson Ranch in case he
failed to repay them), dressed up so as to give Archer and Wolfe
certain additional incentives and to secure the Defendants vario
tax advantages (e.g., the tax write-off for their investment in
Solar Chemical was worth a minimum to Archer and Wolfe of
$60,000.00 -- See Exhibit 11).
32. The Court finds much credibility m the testimony of
Allen. His recollections under oath are entitled to great weigh
He was the only witness to the original negotiations ana the
preparation and execution of the central documents who was not a
party to the same. He has no interest in the Anderson Rancn or
the outcome of this litigation. Judging by his own testimony, ai
that of the Plaintiff, John Clay and John Miller, and Allen's owi
April 29, 1983 Affidavit (Exhibit 27), his statements have been
consistent from the beginning with respect to the true nature of
the parties1 integrated transaction and the Option, in particulai
If Allen's testimony were to be biased, one would reasonably
expect that bias to favor his client- but instead, Allen
.ON & HOGGAN
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33o

By contrast, the testimony of Bill Colman at trial, whei

measured against his admissions on cross-examination. and the
contradictions contained in his prior deposition, his Affidavit o
May 2, 1983 (Exhibit 28), and his handwritten notes (Exhibits 54,
55 and 56), convince the Court that his testimony at trial is
entitled to very little weight or credibility.

Although Colman's

Affidavit and handwritten notes are not strictly necessary to the
Court's decision herein, they represent a more reliable index of
the true history and intention of the parties than his trial
testimony several years later and also serve to seriously impeach
his trial testimony.

His affidavit was signed under oath at a

time when the relevant facts were much fresher in his memory than
at trial, when his recollection of several matters was
insufficient or non-existent.

When Plaintiff's counsel presented

him with Exhibits 54, 55 and 56, Colman expressed considerable
surprise, alarm and anger, but admitted subsequently that they
were copies of his own handwritten notes which he then read for
the Court.

Although trie notes are not totally legible, are

partially cut off by the copier (particularly Exhibit 54) , and
were stapled together by Plaintiff's attorneys, they are for the
most part dated, reference Defendants Archer and Wolfe and nave a
certain narrative flow and consistency that gives them substantial
credibility.

Any undue surprise to Defendants was overcome by the

several days interval they had to inspect the Exhibits after their
introduction and before Colmanfs testimony on the same.

The

demeanor of all the witnesses was significant to the Court during
this trial.
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34. In the late Spring or early Summer of 1982, Miller
learned from Archer and Wolfe that they had obtained an interest
in the Anderson Ranch. Subsequently, either in August or
September of 1982. Miller discussed the status of the Anderson
Ranch with Colman, who represented to Miller that Archer and
Wolfe*s interest in the Anderson Ranch was in the nature of a
security interest. At the same time, Colman indicated a desire
sell his rights in the Anderson Ranch to Miller.
35. Plaintiff's attorney, William L. Fillmore, of Logan,
Utah, (hereinafter "Fillmore"), thereafter communicated with bot
Colman and Allen and received from them copies of the documents
covering the prior integrated transaction between Colman and the
Defendants, including receipt from Colman of the Option with
original signatures of John Archer, Elizabeth Archer and Elliott
Wolfe, and an original notarization by Carole Lake. The
correspondence between Fillmore, Allen and Colman (Exhibits 68,
69, 70 and 71) and testimony at trial indicate the preparation o.
a draft Real Estate Contract by Fillmore, Allen and Colman1s
review of the same, negotiations (including one meeting at the •
Salt Lake Airport between Colman, Miller, Fillmore and John
Miller, the Plaintiff's nephew), and the modification of the
original draft,
36. On November 2, 1982, Colman and Allen met Plaintiff,.
Fillmore and John Miller at the Salt Lake Airport to review and
execute the revised Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 9, hereinafter
the "Real Estate Contract") between Colman and Miller. After
Colman and Allen reviewed the same, Colman and Miller then
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-15executed the Real Estate Contract, dating the same November 2,
1982.

Pursuant to the contractual obligation contained therein.

Miller paid the $1,000.00 consideration to Colman in December,
1982.
37.

The Real Estate Contract assigned all of Colman's rights

under the Option to Miller, granting Miller an independent right
to exercise the Option and acquire 1007o of the Anderson Ranch on
or before June 18, 1982.
38•

Colman knowingly, voluntarily and with advice of counsel

warranted in the Real Estate Contract to Miller that

f,

the Option

is valid and enforcable and, further, that it is freely assignable
in its entirety without the consent or approval of any third
party."
39.

As part of the Real Estate Contract, Miller gave Colman

a new and independent option to reacquire from Miller (if Miller
exercised the Option), on or before July 2, 1983, all of the
Anderson Ranch by paying Plaintiff $650,000.00 on or before that
date (See Exhibit 9, para. 4.a.), and a second option to
reacquire, after July 2, 1983 and on or before July 2, 1984, up to
a 507o interest in the Anderson Ranch by paying his prorated share
of the purchase price, plus interest, taxes and improvements (See
para. 4.b.).

Plaintiff and Colman agreed that the Real Estate

Contract was not assignable by either party without the other
party's prior written consent (See paras. 4.e. and f.).
40.

Also as part of the Real Estate Contract, the parties

granted each other a mutual and reciprocal right of first refusal
with respect to either party's subsequent proposed sale of any of
their rights or interests in the Anderson Ranch, and specified a
thirty (30) day period in which to exercise the same after receipt
of written notice from the selling party, accompanied by a copy of
the duly executed contract of sale (See para. 5 ) .
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-1641. At the November 2, 1982 meeting in SaLt Lake City, Ut<;
whereat the Real Estate Contract was executed, it was observed
that Carole Lake, who had notarized the Option, had failed to fj
in the blank ("March
_, L982") in the notary's paragraph of tlr
original Option., Colman volunteered to have her correct this an
referred to the omission as a simple oversight. Subsequently, tf
Latce did fill in the blank with the number M L" and the Option wa
returned to FilLmore by Colman for recording with the Real Estat
Contract, which recordings were effected in Cache County on
December 20, L982.
42. After Archer and Wolfe received written notice from
Miller's attorney, Fillmore, of Colman's assignment of his Optio
rights to Plaintiff, Archer calLed Fillmore on or about January
1983 and told FiLlmore, among other things, that the $5,000.00 f
the Option had never been paid by Colman. Nonetheless, Archer
indicated that Defendants were still willing to sell the Anderso
Ranch to Plaintiff if he would pay $655,000.00.
43. During January and February of 1983, Archer, Wolfe and
Fillmore engaged in negotiations for Miller's purchase of the
Anderson Ranch' but the sale was never consummated because the
parties could not agree upon terms, and because Miller was seekit
a guaranty from Colman that he would not exercise nis rights
under paragraph 4.a. in order to ensure that rtiiLer would not
incur substantial financing costs in vain.
44. On April 8, 1983, the Defendants attempted to revoke tt
Option by a letter to Colman from the Defendants' prior attorney,
Gregory P. Williams (Exhibit 15), wnerein said attorney advised,
based upon his clients' position that "no consideration was giver
for the Option", that "the offer has been withdrawn".
45. On April 15, 1983, Colman, Allen, Plaintiff, Fillmore,
John Miller and John Clay (an employee and financial adviser of
ION & HOGGAN
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had represented previously as to the history and intent behind th
Option given Colman by the Defendants, in light of Archer and
Wolfe's position on the $5,000.00 and what appeared to be a
probability of litigation over the same.

Colman and Allen

reaffirmed at that meeting to Plaintiff and his attorney and
employees that the $5,000.00 was never intended to be paid, but
was a number pulled out of the air by Allen as he prepared the
documents; that Wolfe represented that he had full authority to
sign the Option for his trust• and that the series of documented
transactions (the Limited Partnership, the Contract, the Special
Warranty Deed(s) and the Option), were all part of one, unified,
integrated scheme which was basically intended to get $500,000o00
to Colman for his salt project, secure the repayment of the same
with the Anderson Ranch and guaranty Colman the right to reacquire
the ranch upon his payback of the $500,000.00 plus a $150,000.00
premium on the same, structured in a way to give Defendants
additional incentives and secure certain tax benefits important tc
them -- all of which comprised the true consideration for the
deal.

Allen and Colman agreed to give Plaintiff their Affidavits

to this effect.
46.

At the April 15, 1983 meeting in Salt Lake City, Colman

also indicated his willingness, after consulting further with
Allen, to sign a Waiver and Release similar to the one previously
requested by Plaintiff in February, 1983 (See Exhibit 34), because
Colman was m

no position to purchase the Anderson Ranch before

July 2, 1983 and wanted Miller to buy it so that he (Colman) could
at least have a shot at acquiring a partial interest on or before
July 2, 1984.
47.

On April 19, 1983, Colman signed a Waiver and Release

for Miller's benefit, which Waiver and Release was subsequently
recorded in Cache County on April 20, 1983 (Exhibit 10,
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Waiver and Release11) .

The intent of Colman and

Miller with the Waiver and Release was to give Miller the
unqualified right, without any fear that Colman would attempt to

bo -••XTJ

-18reacquire 100% of the Ranch, to exercise the Option and
acquire the Anderson Ranch on or before July 2, 1983, thereby (a
guarantying Plaintiff, by Coimanfs waiver of his paragraph 4.a.
option rights, that Plaintiff, at the very least, would be the
owner of 50% of the Anderson Ranch (even if Colman were to
exercise his option under paragraph 4.b. subsequently), (b)
eliminating the June 18, 1983 deadline for Millerfs exercise of
the Option, because Colman was not in a position to exercise his
rights under the Option or the Real Estate Contract by July 2,
1983, and he wanted Miller to do so, and (c) assuring Colman tha
he wouLd later be able to exercise his 50% option reserved under
paragraph 4.b. if he could come up with the money on or before
July 2, 1984, because Miller's ownership of the ranch would then
make the paragraph 4.b. option possible. This mutual intent is
clearly refLected by the language contained in the Waiver and
Release: (viz., "...which Waiver and Release is executed by the
undersigned in order to induce said Ernest Junior Miller to
exercise his rights under the aforesaid Real Estate Contract and
purchase the subject property on or before July 2, 1983, without
fear of any claim of right by William J. Colman to repurchase the:
same from Ernest J. Miller, except as to William J. Colman1s
reserved right to purchase up to a 50% interest in the subject
property after July 2, 1983 and before July 2, 1984."). (Emphasi
added.)
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48. Colman induced Miller to exercise the Option, making it
clear that he had until July 2, 1983 to do so, for Colmanfs
benefit as well as Miller's. Because Colman, at that point, had
to rely on Miller's ability to purchase the ranch, he extended
Miller's time to exercise the Option until July 2, 1983, and
reserved only his right to reacquire up to 50% the next year. It
would have been irrational, given his financial circumstances and
his dependence on Miller's exercise, for Colman to arbitrarily
(and against his own best interests) limit the time for Miller to
exercise the Option. The purpose of the Waiver and Release was
further corroborated by Colman's subsequent conduct after its

63 -U021J
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execution (i.e.. no objection) and by Miller's conduct in
reliance thereon (i.e., its execution on July 1), The Court also
notes that the Defendants were not parties to the Waiver and
Release, nor were they privy to Coiman and Miller's intent
regarding the same.
49.

No consideration is stated on the face of the Waiver anc

Release, but the Court finds from the testimony at trial that it
was given by Coiman in exchange for MilLerfs assurance that he
would exercise the Option, guarantying Coiman another year to
acquire a partial interest in the ranch, and as additional
consideration, for Miller's promise to Coiman that he would not
have to pay interest on any exercise of his paragraph 4.b. option
and that, in any event, Coiman would be entitled to use the
property for recreational purposes for the rest of his life.
50.

Following a review of two draft affidavits prepared by

Fillmore, Allen prepared his own Affidavit (Exhibit 27), signed
and had it notarized on April 29, 1983.

Allen spent the better

part of the morning on May 2, 1983 with Coiman, preparing and
modifying his draft of Colman's Affidavit (Exhibit 2 8 ) , which was
reviewed and discussed by them paragraph-by-paragraph, amended by
them, and then executed by Coiman and notarized by Allen's
secretary, all on the same day.
51.

On April 18, 1983, Plaintiff called Archer and offered

to pay $650,000.00 to the Defendants for the Anderson Ranch under
the Option.

Archer indicated that he would have to visit with

Wolfe before responding.

On April 20, 1983, Archer called Miller

back and informed him of the Defendants' rejection of Miller's
offer of $650,000.00 for the Anderson Ranch, indicating that
Defendants did not want to sell the property.
52.

In April of 1983, Archer and Wolfe attempted to persuade

Coiman to exercise his option rights under paragraph 4.a. of the
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Real Estate Contract, so that Archer, Wolfe and Coiman could sell
the property to a third party, and cut Plaintiff out (See Exhibits
2, 56 and 74).

They were subsequently advised by Allen,
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however that the Waiver and Release which Colman had signed
for Miller's benefit made such an attempt to prevent Miller fro
acquiring the ranch ilLegal.
53. On May 16, L983. Plaintiff filed this action against t
Defendants and a Lis Pendens against the Anderson Ranch, On Jun
240 1983, the Defendants filed their Answer. Defendants filed
their Third-Party Complaint against Colman on June 30. 1983o and
then filed their Amended Answer and Counterclaim against Plainti
on July 1. 1983.
54. On or about June 27 or 28, 1983, Fillmore called E.
Craig Smay, of Salt Lake City, Utah, the Defendants1 attorney
(hereinafter MSmaylf) , to determine the Dest way to make the form*
tender of the $650,000.00 to the Defendants under the Option in
the context of this pending litigation concerning the same
property, the Option and the same parties. Inasmuch as Archer ai
Wolfe had rejected Miller's prior offer, and had expressly
repudiated the Option in their Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint,
all parties and their attorneys understood that Miller's tender c
a cashier's check would not be accepted by the Defendants.
Moreover, neither Archer nor Wolfe were in the State at the time.
Archer admitted on the stand that he would not have accepted
Plaintiff's tender of $650,000.00 on July 1, 1983 in any event.
Fillmore and Smay determined that the best way to handle the
matter would be to tender the $650,000.00 to the Defendants via
the Court and then deposit the same upon endorsement in a
Court-supervised, interest-bearing account.
55. On July I. 1983, Fillmore met with Smay at the latterfs
office in Salt Lake City and tendered to Smay, as Defendants'
attorney. Plaintiff's cashier's check to the Defendants for
$650,000.00 (Exhibit 13), which money had been borrowed by
Plaintiff, subject to interest charges. At said meeting the
attorneys modified and signed a Delivery of Check and Motion and
stipulated Order (Exhibit 14), with the express understanding tha
the check would be deposited in a Court-supervised, interestbearing account and that "entitlement to accrued interest shall b
determined by the Court". Pursuant thereto, tillmore later
fcl'b?
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that same day filed said Delivery of Check and Motion and the
Order with this Court and deposited the check with the Clerk of
the Court.
56.

The language contained in Plaintiff's Complaint, and in

the Delivery of Check and Motion and the stipulated Order, and the
verbal expressions of Fillmore to Smay on July 1, 1983, substantially conformed with the tender language requirements of
paragraph 3 of the Option.
57.

The Option was exercised on July 1? 1983 by Plaintiff,

without any objection or protest being made by Colman to Piaintif1
either before or since.
58.

The Option was exercised by Plaintiff according to its

terms - i.e., the Option called for a tender of $650,000.00 on or
before July 2, 1983, which requirements Plaintiff met precisely*
The Defendants were in no way prejudiced by the date of
Plaintiff's execise of the Option, inasmuch as they had already
granted that much time to the original optionee-

Moreover, the

Defendants had already made it abundantly clear to Plaintiff, by
virtue of their prior rejections, that they did not intend to
accept any tender by Plaintiff regardless of when it might be
made.
59.

Shortly thereafter, at Smay's suggestion, the parties

through their attorneys entered into a Stipulation to replace the
original check (Exhibit 13) with a new check (Exhibit 16), so as
to permit the deposit of the tendered funds, in the absence of the
Defendants from the State, into an interest-bearing account.
Pursuant to that Stipulation, $650,000.00 was subsequently
deposited at First Interstate Bank, Logan Branch.

In the Fall of

1983, the deposited funds were invested in revolving monthly
Certificates of Deposit at said, bank, which arrangement continued
until the time of trial.
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60.

On July 2, 1984 Colman, Archer and Wolfe enterea into a

certain Agreement (Exhibit 33). whereby Colman, for $5,000.00. n as
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further consideration for this agreement," agreed to convey to
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Archer and Wolfe a fifty percent (507o) interest in the Anderson
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Ranch which he hoped to procure through an attempted exercise
of his paragraph 4.b. option under the Real Estate Contract* anc
whereby Archer and Wolfe agreed to permit Plaintiff to withdraw
$364,000.00 from the Court-supervised savings account, as and fc
Colman's tender of that sum, to make possible Colman's exercise
the 4.b. option, with the express understanding that Colman woul
deed said interest over to Archer and Wolfe upon his receipt of
deed from Miller. The Defendants and their attorney had
previously received copies of the Real Estate Contract by way of
Plaintiff's prior pleadings and the discovery herein.
61. On July 2, 1984, a Notice from CoLman (Exhibit 31) and
Stipulation from the Defendants (Exhibit 32) was ser,ved on John
Clay, an officer of E. A. Miller & Sons Packing Co., & compan/ —
effectively controlled by Plaintiff, advising Plaintiff that
Defendants were willing to allow him to withdraw $364,000.00 fro
the Court-supervised account for purposes of Colman's exercise o
the 4.b. option, which attempted exercise of the 4.b. option by
Colman (and Archer and Wolfe) was never accepted by Miller.
62. Nonetheless, the funds in the Court-supervised account
were not Colman1s funds, nor were they the Defendants' funds absent their delivery of a deed to Plaintiff (See the terms of Exh
bit 14, paragraph 4), which they had not done. Moreover, if Mil
ler had accepted such a tender on July 2, and withdrawn the fundi
the withdrawal would have been subject to an early withdrawal
penalty under the certificate of deposit (See Exhibit 60).
63. Prior to Colman's (and the Defendants') attempted exercise of the 4.b. option, neither Colman nor Defendants had secure
Plaintiff's prior written approval of any assignment of Colman1s
rights, as required by paragraph 4.f. of the Real Estate Contract
nor was there any prior verbal notice to or approval by Plaintiff
In fact, it appears that Defendants structured their deal in a
deliberate manner to avoid the non-assignability clause.
64. In connection with Colman's (and the Defendants')
attempted exercise of the 4.b. option, no recognition was ever
given to Miller's first right of refusal. The Plaintiff was neve

lM>.f
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given written (or verbal) notice of the Agreement between
Defendants and Colman, nor the sale terns thereof which he would
have to meet, nor was he ever allowed to exercise his first right
of refusal within thirty (30) days after receiving a copy of what
should have been a conditional agreement between Colman and the
Defendants, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Real Estate Contract.
Plaintiff did not learn of, or receive a copy of, the Agreement
between the Defendants and Colman until the discovery of the same
was compelled at Defendants' second depositions on September 27,
1984.

The Agreement between Colman and the Defendants

unconditionally required Colman to convey to Defendants all his
rights in the Anderson Ranch which he was to acquire pursuant to
paragraph 4.b.
65.

of the Real Estate Contract.

The Court finds no persuasive evidence of any kind

suggesting collusion or conspiracy between Colman and Plaintiff to
defraud Defendants of their interests in the Anderson Ranch or
regarding any damages suffered by Defendants related thereto, as
alleged in their Amended Answer and Counterclaim.

Indeed,

Defendants introduced little, if any, evidence concerning these
allegations.
C
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The legal description of the Anderson Ranch contained in

the Contract, the Option, the Real Estate Contract, the Waiver and
Release and Plaintiff's Complaint all contain an obvious
scrivenor's error, referencing "Township 10 South11, instead of the
correct description, "Township 10 North", under Parcel 3.
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None of

the parties herein are under any misconception as to which
property was intended to be sold, assigned or otherwise referred
to in these documents and pleadings, nor have Defendants seriously
claimed any prejudice if the Court reforms the same.
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-2467. The Defendants have enioyed possession and all rights
ownership of the Anderson Ranch since Plaintiff1s July 1, 1983
tender of the $650,000.00. The Defendants have executed leases
with third parties for the use of the Anderson Ranch, most recen
ly with Boyd Munns, to run cattle on the ranch property. All
rents paid under such leases have been received by the Defendant
68. In contrast to the Defendants, the Plaintiff has
received no rents or income, nor has he had any other commercial
benefit, from the Anderson Ranch since his tender of $650,000.00
on July 1, 1983; nor has he had the use of his money since then.
What limited and sporadic recreational use Plaintiff has had of
the ranch has been without objection by the owners and similar t
that enjoyed historically by many others in the area.
69. The Defendants could have received the $650,000.00
lodged in the Court-supervised savings account at any time after
July 1, 1983 if they would have provided Plaintiff with a proper
deed, but they have never delivered a deed to Plaintiff entitling
them to said tender money.
70. The Court finds no persuasive evidence of any collusioi
or conspiracy between Colman and Miller to defraud the Defendant
out of their interests in the Anderson .Ranch, as alleged by
Defendants1 in their Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint.
71. Exhibits 54,55 and 56 are notes made by Colman at or
about the time of various conversations between Colman, Archer ai
Wolfe and should be admitted as evidence. Exhibit 28 is Colman?
Affidavit made prior to this litigation and is corroborative of
the Court's findings on various issues and should be admitted in
evidence for all purposes.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has in rem iurisdiction over the Anderson
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Ranch; p e r s o n a l i u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e P l a i n t i f f ,

all

the

-25Defendants and the Third-Party Defendant; and subject matter
jurisdiction over those matters which have been brought before the
Court by way of the parties' pleadings, including without
limitation all matters affecting title to the Anderson Ranch as
between the parties named herein,
2. That the Real Estate Contract is valid and enforceable in
all respects and that the Option granted by Archer and Wolfe to
Colman is irrevocable, valid in all respects and is supported by a
sufficient consideration.
3. That the Option was fully assignable by Colman, was
assigned to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is the owner and holder of
the Option. The Waiver and Release is a valid and enforceable
agreement in all respects and extended to July 2, 1983 the time
within which Miller should exercise the Option.
4. That Plaintiff made a valid exercise of the Option under
the circumstances and is entitled to a decree specifically
enforcing the Option.
5. Given the uniqueness of the Anderson Ranch property,
money damages would be inadequate compensation to the Plaintiff
for Defendants1 repudiation of the Option.
6. That Plaintiff has paid the purchase price provided in
the Option by depositing the same with the Clerk of the Court and
a decree should enter awarding the $650,000.00 so paid by
Plaintiff to Defendants.
7. That interest accrued on the $650,000.00 purchase price
deposited with the Court is the property of Plaintiff and a decree
should enter awarding Plaintiff all interest accrued on said
$650,000.00 while in the custody of the Clerk of the Court.
8. That a decree should enter correcting the scrivenors
error describing Parcel 3 of the legal description in the Option,
Real Estate Contract, the Waiver and Release, and Plaintiff's
N & HOGGAN
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Verified Complaint, to Township 10 North rather than Township
10 South.
9. Neither the ReaL Estate Contract or the rights and
entitlements of Colman thereunder were assignable by Colman to a
third party without Plaintiff's prior written consent, which
consent was never sought nor given by Plaintiff .
lb* The first right of refusal granted to Miller by Colman
under paragraph 5 of the Real Estate Contract was a valid, legal
right vested in Miller and enforceable by him against Colman and
any third party.
11. The Waiver and Release was a valid and enforceable
agreement between Colman and Plaintiff, was supported by adequat
consideration and was intended to and did enable Plaintiff to
lawfully exercise the Option to purchase the Anderson Ranch on o
before July 2, 1983.
12. The attempted exercise of the paragraph 4.b. option
under the Real Estate Contract by Colman (and Defendants) on Jul
2, 1984 was an invalid exercise of that option right and is,
therefore, void and of no effect.
13. The said Warranty Deeds from Royalty Investment
Corporation to Defendants on the Anderson Ranch effected a valid
conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Royalty Investment Corporati
to Defendants.
14. An order should enter admitting Exhibits- 28, 54, 55 an
56 in evidence.-/^ <_. "fv v- fj <._*i//i/ A/ ) /;'/-,:,'< .:-- ,\«L ~7, • /.<. 7^
15. Possession of trie Anderson Ranch should b£^delivered t
Plaintiff.
16. Though the Court finds that the applicable burden of
proof upon Plaintiff is a preponderance of the evidence, the Cou
concludes that Plaintiff has sustained his burden of proving his
claims against Defendants and Third-Party Defendants in this cas
SON & HOGGAN
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clear

and c o n v i n c i n g

evidence.

-2717. Plaintiff's pleadings should be amended to conform in
all respects to Plaintiff's theories, arguments and evidence
presented at trial.
LET JUDGMENT EJ^TER ACCORDINGLY:
DATED this "/' day of- J u ^ , ~1986.
,'m

Omer J. Call
District Judtge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Defendants1 Attorney,
E. Craig Smay, at 208 Kearns Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101; and to Third-Party Defendant, William J. Colman,
at 1935 South Main, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, postage
prepaid in Logan, Utah, this <£^£ day of July, 1986.

A^S$k*c
f%Lf**
L^ Brent Hogg an ,/ /
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L. Brent Hoggan
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
ERNEST J. MILLER,
Plaintiff,
vs

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH
B. ARCHER, both individually and
as Trustees for the Elizabeth
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott
Wolfe Trust No. 701,
Defendants.

JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH
B. ARCHER, both individually and
as Trustees for the Elizabeth
Dalv Archer Trust, and HUBERT
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott
Wolfe Trust No. 701,

Civil No. 21692

Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
-4 & HOGGAN
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EST CENTER

WILLIAM J. COLMAN,
Third-Party Defendant.
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&£TH 3. ALIBI, Clerk
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-2THIS MATTER having come on for trial before the
above-entitled Court, the Honorable Omer Je Call, District Judge
presiding and sitting without a iury, on September 18, 19, 20, 2"
October 3, November 14, and December 17, 1985; and Plaintiff
having been represented by its counsel of record, L. Brent Hoggai
of Olson & Hoggan, the Defendants having been represented by the"
counsel of record, E. Craig Smay, and the Third-Party Defendant
having been represented by himself; and the Court having heard
testimony from witnesses for all the parties hereto during the
trial hereof and having received certain exhibits offered by the
parties as evidence in the matter; and the Court having received
trial briefs from counsel for both Plaintiff and the Defendants c
the primary issues before the Court, and having reviewed the
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment prepared by Plaintiff and the
Defendants1 Objections thereto, and the Court: having heretofore
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:

ON&HOGGAN

1. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure No. 15, and on
Plaintiff's motion at trial, the Plaintiff's Complaint is deemed
amended to conform to the evidence and Plaintiff's arguments at
trial, specifically including but not limited to quieting title 1
the Anderson Ranch with regard to Colman's (and Archer and
Wolfe's) attempted exercise of the 4.b. option one (1)-year aftei
this litigation commenced, Plaintiff's claim to the accruing
interest on the tender money, and Plaintiff's request that the
Option, Real Estate Contract, Waiver and Release and the Complait
herein be reformed to reflect the correct legal description of t\
Anderson Ranch.
2. The Court declares that the recorded Option, Real Estate
Contract and Waiver and Release are valid agreements, binding on
a l l parties thereto, and fully enforceable by Plaintiff as the
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-3proper assignee of Colmanfs Option on the Anderson Ranch and
all appurtenant water rights.
3. Plaintiff is the owner and holder of the Option, the
Option is declared irrevocable, and by virtue of Plaintiff's
proper exercise of the Option and Plaintiff's tender on July 1,
1983 of the purchase price provided in the Option, the Option is
specifically enforced and title to the Anderson Ranch situated in
Cache County, Utah and described as follows:
Parcel 1: The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter;
the South half of the Northeast quarter; the Southeast
quarter of the Northwest quarter; the East half of the
Southeast quarter; the Northwest quarter of the Southwest
quarter of Section 26; the North half of the Northwest
quarter; the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of
Section 25; the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter;
the Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter; the Southwest
quarter of the Southeast quarter; the South half of the
Southwest quarter of Section 24; the Southeast quarter of the
Southeast quarter of Section 23; in Township 10 North, Range
3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; Lots 2, 3 and 4; the
Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter; the Southwest
quarter of the Southeast quarter; and the Northeast quarter
of the Southeast quarter of Section 19, Township 10 North,
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 2: The West half of the Southeast quarter and the
East half of the Southwest quarter of Section 26, Township 10
North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 3: The Northeast quarter; the Southeast quarter of
the Northwest quarter; the Northeast quarter of the Southwest
quarter; the Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of
Section 19, the East half of the Northeast quarter; and the
North half of the Southeast quarter of Section 30, in
Township 10 North, Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and
Meridian. Also the Southwest quarter of Section 25, and the
Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 26,
Township 10 North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
•N&HOGGAN

Parcel 4: The West half of the Northeast quarter; the
Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter; and the Southeast
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-4quarter of the Southwest quarter; of Section 30, Township 1
North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
Containing 1840,14 acres, more or less, subject to existing
rights of way.
Together with »all water rights appurtenant to the abovedescribed property.
is hereby vested and quieted in Plaintiff free and clear of
all right and claim by Defendants, Royalty Investment Corporatic
or Colman and any claiming by, under or through Defendants,
Royalty Investment Corporation or Colman.
4. The $650,000.00 deposited by Plaintiff with the Clerk c
the Court is declared to be payment in full by Plaintiff to
Defendants for the Anderson Ranch. The Clerk of the Court is
authorized and directed to deliver to Defendants on their reques
the $650,000.00 principal.
5. All interest accrued on the $650,000.00 deposited by
Plaintiff with the Clerk of the Court is declared to be the
property of Plaintiff and the Clerk of the Court is authorized a
directed to deliver all such accrued interest to Plaintiff on hi
request.
6. The legal description in the Option (recorded in Book 3
at Page 144 of the records of the Cache County, Utah Recorder) i
the Real Estate Contract (recorded in Book 310 at: Page 147 of th
records of the Cache County, Utah Recorder) in the Waiver and
Release (recorded in Book 315 and Page 658 of the records of the
Cache County, Utah Recorder), as well as in the Verified Complai
filed by the Plaintiff herein, are each and all reformed to show
Parcel 3 situated in Township 10 North, rather than Township 10
South.
7. That possession of the Anderson Ranch, described above,
is hereby delivered to PLaintiff free and clear of any claim,
SON & HOGGAN
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-5possessory or otherwise, of Defendants, Third-Party Defendants
and Royalty Investment Corporation, or any claiming by, under or
through Defendants and/or Third-Party Defendants and/or Royalty
Investment Corporation.
8. The attempted exercise of the paragraph 4.b. option under
the Real Estate Contract by Colman (and Archer and Wolfe) on July
2, 1984 is declared by the Court to be an invalid exercise of that
option right. The agreement and any assignments or conveyances of
whatsoever nature between Colman and the Defendants related
thereto are hereby declared void and of no effect as to the
parties herein; and full, undivided title in fee simple to the
Anderson Ranch is hereby quieted in Plaintiff as against any and
all claims or rights of Defendants, Third-Party Defendants and
Royalty Investment Corporation, or any claiming by, under or
through Defendants and/or Third-Party Defendants and/or Royalty
Investment Corporation.
9. The Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment and
Motion To Strike are rendered moot by this Judgment and Decree,
which effectively grants the partial relief sought by those
motions but which is based on the entire trial record.
10. The Defendants1 Cross-Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment is denied. Defendants1 Counterclaim against the
Plaintiff and Defendants1 Third-Party Complaint against Colman are
dismissed with prejudice.
11. That Exhibits 28, 54, 55 and 56 ar$ admitted in
, /
evidence^^w \ ^ ,/ - '•; ;/'' *"* * -->-<• * - • •• -•<
v/*> - -- •'
12.' The parties shall bear their own respective attorney's
fees, but Plaintiff is awarded his court costs incurred herein*.
^day o f i ^ f c ^ , 1986.
DATED t h i s
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-6MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoii
Judgment and Decree to Defendants1 Attorney, E. Craig Smay, at 2<
Kearns Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; and
to Third-Party Defendant, William Jo Colman, at 1935 South Main,
Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, postage prepaid in Logan,
Utah, this tf^ day of July, 1986.

/^A%c*f~*
L. Brent Hoggan
WLF/28
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-7MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a certified copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Judgment and Decree to
L. Brent Hoggan, Olson & Hoggan, Attorneys for Plaintiff, 56 West Center,
P. 0. Box 525, Logan, Utah 84321; E. Craig Smay at 208 Kearns Building,
136 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 and to Third-Party Defendant,
William J. Colman, at 1935 South Main, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah
84105, postage prepaid in Brigham City, Utah, this 7th day of August,
1986.
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Mary C. Holmgren-Deputy
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